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Abstract
Concerted efforts are underway to establish an infrastructure for a global quantum
Internet to realise a spectrum of quantum technologies. This will enable more precise
sensors, secure communications, and faster data processing. Quantum communications
are a front‐runner with quantum networks already implemented in several metropolitan
areas. A number of recent proposals have modelled the use of space segments to over-
come range limitations of purely terrestrial networks. Rapid progress in the design of
quantum devices have enabled their deployment in space for in‐orbit demonstrations. We
review developments in this emerging area of space‐based quantum technologies and
provide a roadmap of key milestones towards a complete, global quantum networked
landscape. Small satellites hold increasing promise to provide a cost effective coverage
required to realise the quantum Internet. The state of art in small satellite missions is
reviewed and the most current in‐field demonstrations of quantum cryptography are
collated. The important challenges in space quantum technologies that must be overcome
and recent efforts to mitigate their effects are summarised. A perspective on future de-
velopments that would improve the performance of space quantum communications is
included. The authors conclude with a discussion on fundamental physics experiments
that could take advantage of a global, space‐based quantum network.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is
properly cited.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
The second quantum revolution promises a paradigm shift in
quantum technologies that will deliver new capabilities, and
performance enhancements in security, accuracy and precision
[1]. The working principles that permit these performance
improvements are deep‐rooted phenomena in quantum me-
chanics, such as entanglement [2], teleportation [3–5], the
Heisenberg uncertainty principle [6] and the no‐cloning theo-
rem [7]. With no classical analogues, these effects illustrate a
key departure from classical physics and are at the heart of
delivering improvements to technologies that underpin mod-
ern society. Fundamentally, quantum theory governs how in-
formation is instantiated and processed in the configuration of
matter and energy. This realisation led to an explosion in the
development of quantum technologies. The race to develop
mature quantum technologies has become a discipline in its
own right with major renewed international efforts, both
governmental and commercial.
A number of technologies can inherit enhanced perfor-
mances and securities when availed to quantum mechanical
resources. These technologies include sensing [8–10],
metrology [11–13], navigation and timing [14], state discrimi-
nation [15–17], communication [18, 19] and computation [20].
Today, these technologies have long evolved from theoretical
curiosities to significant developments and even field realisa-
tions. Notably, enhanced quantum sensors are now in the
vanguard of early practical application of quantum technolo-
gies. Fundamental precision bounds to measurements of
physical signals can be attained by exploiting specific quantum
correlations in probe states [21]. This was recently applied in
the Laser Interferometer Gravitational‐Wave Observatory,
which significantly improves the maturity of gravitational wave
astronomy [22–24]. Further, implementation of secure quan-
tum communications have gained momentum owing to sus-
tained improvements in quantum key distribution (QKD)
protocols [18]. These improvements have boosted the appetite
for early adoption of dedicated quantum technologies.
While focussed works have demonstrated performance
improvements across the spectrum of quantum technologies,
they do not yet satisfy the concomitant technological demand.
In addition, most practical applications require the joint
operation of multiple quantum technologies. Recent works
have established a path towards practical realisation and
readiness, by requiring a networked infrastructure of dedicated
quantum technologies to upscale capabilities. The essential
resource in networked quantum technologies is quantum
entanglement, which can be distributed directly [25–28] or
through swapping [3, 29] and purification [30, 31] operations
across an arbitrary topology of quantum nodes [32–41].
Heuristically, two attributes of quantum entanglement motivate
a networked approach to quantum technologies. First, quan-
tum correlations between entangled nodes grants maximum
coordination among distant processors. This provides a natural
approach to quantum clock synchronisation [14, 42]. It also
heralds great potential for applications that employ distributed
systems, such as distributed sensing [43–48], astronomical
long‐baseline interferometry [49], enhanced positioning [50],
and consensus and agreement tasks [51, 52]. Second, the
monogamy of entanglement provides an inherent privacy that
cannot be breached [19]. This is particularly suited to quantum
cryptography, where QKD enables secure communications
between multiple remote network nodes [25]. The impetus to
develop quantum communication is primitive and born from
the growing threat of quantum computers on the classical
cryptosystems.
A networked infrastructure is also intuitively reasoned in
quantum computing, where computationally intensive tasks are
delegated across shared systems [53, 54]. In direct analogy with
classical computing, the capability of quantum computers
significantly improves with remote access to ubiquitous
quantum processors. Improvements to this delegated approach
to quantum computing is conditioned on the existence of high‐
speed global quantum communications networks. By viewing it
in this way, QKD has become the precursor to early applica-
tions of quantum communications. The parallel advancements
in quantum communications and networked quantum
computing progressively evolves the maturity of an emerging
quantum Internet [55–57]. This is anticipated to impart a
similar revolutionary impact on our world as the classical
Internet.
To date, the distance‐limited span of quantum networks
restricts a concrete implementation of this vision. Overcoming
this limitation captures the essence of an increasing number of
recent works in quantum communications. Ultimately, pho-
tonic losses dissolve the hope for a quantum Internet based on
optical fibre networks alone. Quantum repeaters [58–62] can
extend this capability by providing efficient routing of entan-
glement [32–35]. Quantum networks have emerged in and
between major metropolis areas [25, 63–65]. Despite signifi-
cant progress on quantum repeaters, global quantum networks
remain a hopeful endeavour. The inability to place quantum
repeaters along geographically inimical locations rules that
option alone as insufficient. The emergence of the quantum
Internet necessarily requires the combination of both terrestrial
and space‐based segments.
In this review, we focus on capturing the fast progress in
the emerging area of space‐based quantum communications.
We detail a roadmap to a future implementation of the quan-
tum Internet that unifies both terrestrial and space networks.
We start by first exploring applications of a fully operational
quantum network in Section 2. The state of art for each
application is provided. In Section 3, we review the progress to
date in the emerging area of satellite‐based quantum commu-
nications. This section highlights key milestones in field‐
demonstrations. We distinguish these demonstrations in
terms of the size of the satellite(s) involved in the quantum
network. In Section 4, we explore outstanding challenges that
currently impede the maturity of space quantum communica-
tions. We draw attention to current efforts to mitigate these
challenges. In section 5, we review key enabling technologies.
Section 6 provides an outlook to the open questions in
quantum mechanics that can be addressed with access to a
mature realisation of space‐based quantum communication
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network. Throughout this review, we aim to capture the rapid
progress in the race to realise global quantum communications.
To achieve this, we draw attention to progress in different
academic, governmental and commercial efforts, in addition to
ongoing difficulties in space technologies.
2 | APPLICATIONS
The quantum Internet is set to deliver a profound impact
across a range of technological frontiers, including quantum
communications, computation and metrology. The working
infrastructure to this is a globally interconnected network of
quantum information processors that deliver enhanced capa-
bilities over the use of purely classical information. Attaining
such a connectivity over global scale requires the maturity of
both ground and satellite nodes that allows efficient distribu-
tion and routing of quantum entanglement across the network,
and teleportation of quantum states between nodes.
A roadmap for the development of satellite‐based quantum
networks is presented in Figure 1. In this section, we review
specific applications of the quantum Internet.
2.1 | Quantum key distribution
Quantum computation [66] has the potential for a paradigm
change for solving problems in simulation and optimisation
[67, 68]. However, these new computational capabilities also
threaten the security of near‐ubiquitous public key cryptosys-
tems such as the Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) protocol [69]
or Elliptic Curve Cryptography [70] that underlie much of the
Internet infrastructure. While purely classical advances in
number theory have posed ongoing threats to RSA [71], the
possibility of implementing Shor's algorithm [72] on a large
scale quantum computer in the near term poses a risk to both
RSA and ECC that cannot be ignored, with major advances in
scaling up quantum processors by companies such as Google
[73], IBM [74] and Honeywell [75] highlighting a shrinking
horizon until the cryptographic quantum apocalypse. Alter-
native methods for private communication that are quantum
secure need to be developed.
Progress along this endeavour has primarily proceeded along
two distinct routes. First is post‐quantum cryptography (PQC),
which replaces RSAwith alternative classical cryptosystems that
are robust to factorisation and quantum algorithms [76]. How-
ever, PQC schemes provide a partial solution since they are not
information‐theoretically secure. The second one is a more
promising candidate for quantum‐safe encryption called QKD,
which guarantees the privacy, authentication, and confidentiality
of secure communications. Specifically, signals encoded in op-
tical quantum systems are processed to provide a secure
encryption key, which comes with a computable assessment of
the knowledge of an eavesdropper. QKD systems are opera-
tionally different to classical encryption systems. They take
advantage of fundamental properties in quantum mechanics,
such as the uncertainty principle or the monogamy of entan-
glement [19, 77] to safeguard against adversaries with access to
arbitrary computational power. There are three distinct families
of differentQKDprotocols [18]. First are discrete‐variable (DV)
protocols that use discrete quantum degree of freedom to
encode information, such as polarisation for free‐space appli-
cations and phase coding in fibre‐based approaches [78–82].
A second, natural alternative approach to QKD protocols
is to use continuous‐variable (CV) systems [83–95]. In general,
thanks to the use of an infinite‐dimensional Hilbert space, CV
systems can transfer more information per signal compared
with qubit‐based approaches and rely on cheaper technological
implementations; this advantage can be achieved assuming
some favourable working conditions and good data‐processing
performance. A final class of QKD protocols, referred to as
distributed‐phase‐reference coding, implements a hybrid
approach [96, 97]. These protocols differ in the detection
scheme used. DV and distributed‐phase‐reference protocols
use photon counters and postselect the events in which a
detection has effectively taken place. For some wavelengths,
photon counters can suffer from low quantum detector effi-
ciencies (DE) and are susceptible to high dark count rates
(DCRs) and long dead times. CV protocols overcome these by
using homodyne detection. However, a tradeoff between key
rate and noise must be addressed for CV approaches. QKD
devices have continuously increased their key generation rate
and have started approaching maturity, ready for imple-
mentation in realistic settings [18, 19]. Secure communications
then follow through applications of the one‐time pad
encryption [98, 99]. This encryption scheme is provably secure
provided the keys are secure and not reused, and they are as
long as the text to be encrypted [100].
F I GURE 1 Stages to achieve a global satellite‐based quantum Internet.
Demonstrating each state reflects an increase to the functionality of the
network at the expense of increased technological difficulty. For each stage,
we note example applications and protocols that can be demonstrated. See
Ref. [57] for a terrestrial‐focussed roadmap. QKD, quantum key
distribution
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Prominent QKD protocols include the original Bennett–
Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol [78], the two‐state Bennett
1992, (B92) protocol [101] and the six‐state protocol [102]. For
entanglement‐based protocols, the common QKD protocols
are the Ekert 91 (E91) [80] and the BBM92 [79] protocols.
Each protocol has their unique advantages and limitations. We
direct the reader to Ref. [18] for a comprehensive review on
different DV and CV protocols.
The choice for the quantum degree of freedom used to
encode information depends on the type of protocols used. A
common DV approach is to use the polarisation of light [78].
Polarisation states are simple to prepare, control and measure.
Furthermore, it is possible to produce high fidelity polarisation
entangled photons [103]. Since there are only two linearly in-
dependent polarisation states, only one bit per photon can be
encoded using this approach. There are alternative DV
encodings that include the orbital angular momentum (OAM)
[104, 105] and time‐bin encodings [106, 107]. Both of these
approaches allow multiple encoded bits on each photon. These
high‐dimensional encodings can also be more robust to certain
types of errors [108, 109]. However, these encodings are more
difficult to realise experimentally. To illustrate this, consider the
example of time‐bin encodings. Entangled photon pairs that
are in a superposition of many different discrete time‐bins can
be prepared using a mode‐locked laser with beam‐shaping
techniques. It is possible to encode 10 bits per photon with
practical laboratory conditions [110]. However, the greater the
number of time‐bins, the more difficult it becomes to perform
the mutually unbiased measurement needed to detect an
eavesdropper. For this reason, it is common to adopt a hybrid
CV–DV encoding and use the so‐called energy‐time entangled
photons. These are photons that are entangled both in time‐of‐
arrival and frequency. Discrete time‐bins can be imposed on
the continuous time‐of‐arrival. An eavesdropper is then
detected by a suitable interferometeric measurement [111].
QKD has been demonstrated reliably on the ground, and
the process of being deployed across ground networks is well
under way. To attain better key rates, practical implementations
of QKD differ from theoretical proposals primarily in the
components used in the system. Unfortunately, most security
proofs are very sensitive to small differences between the
physical devices used by the protocol and the theoretical model
used to describe them. This introduces side channels to QKD
systems that can be exploited for vulnerabilities in practical
devices [112–119], therefore introducing an important trade‐
off between security and rate [120]. There is another crucial
trade‐off that must be considered. The foremost that hinders
the maturity of QKD across global scales is the trade‐off be-
tween rate and distance [121–123], typically induced by scat-
tering effects in optical fibres [124, 125]. Specifically, the
maximum number of secret bits that can be distributed over a
lossy channel with transmissivity η is upper bounded by the
repeaterless PLOB bound − log 2 (1 − η) [123], which
approximately amounts to 1.44η bits per channel use at low
transmissivity. This corresponds to the secret‐key capacity of
the lossy channel, an optimal key rate that cannot be overcome
by any point‐to‐point protocol [18]. A similar limitation affects
the free‐space fading channel between two ground station,
so that the optimal key rate cannot exceed the bound [126]
−Δ log 2 (1 − η), where η is the maximum free‐space line‐of‐
sight transmissivity and Δ accounts for the non‐trivial turbu-
lence effects on the ground.
Quantum repeaters [58–62] and, more generally, multi‐hop
quantum networks [32–35] can provide better rates over long
distances. However, these strategies provide only limited
remission and have their own limitations in achievable key
rates. In particular, for a chain of quantum repeaters connected
by fibre‐links with transmissivities ηi, the maximum secret key
rate achievable by the two end‐users (i.e., Alice and Bob at the
two opposite ends of the chain) cannot exceed −log 2
(1 − miniηi) bits per use of the chain [33]. The previous for-
mula implies that, for Alice and Bob being able to generate 1
secret bit per chain use, we may tolerate at most 3 dB of loss in
each individual link, which means that we need to insert a
repeater every 15 km (at the standard fibre loss of 0.2 dB/km).
Therefore, despite significant progress, all ground‐based QKD
approaches remain distance‐limited due to loss. These limita-
tions make purely ground‐based systems very challenging or
even impractical for a global distribution network. Besides
QKD entanglement distribution also remains an open chal-
lenge over global transmission lengths. This latter aspect,
together with practical types of quantum repeaters, will be
discussed in Section 2.4.
The range of communication may be extended by
employing satellites equipped with high‐quality optical links.
Figure 2 illustrates different configurations of satellite‐based
quantum communications. The use of satellites reduces the
demand on the number of ground quantum repeaters, since a
single trusted‐node satellite may physically travel from the
proximity of Alice to the proximity of Bob, with the loss
affecting only the uplink and downlink channels. It is also due
to the fact that inter‐satellite communications would be
affected by less noise and loss with respect to ground links.
The use of both ground and satellite‐based quantum repeater
networks provide the most promising solution to extend
quantum communications to global scales. This provides a
practical roadmap towards the implementation of a full
quantum Internet [55–57]. It also paves the way to a promising
realisation of a global networked infrastructure for global
communication [133, 134], imaging [135], and enhanced
sensing [8–12].
Transmitting information via satellites comes with its
own difficulties [136–140]. Besides loss effects induced by
free‐space diffraction and atmospheric extinction (due to
absorption and scattering), we also need to account for the
inevitable beam wandering caused by pointing and tracking
errors (specifically important for downlink) and atmospheric
turbulence (relevant for uplink). Besides these effects, there
is also the presence of background thermal noise affecting
the receiver. Depending on the configuration, this may come
from the sky or from the planetary albedos of the Earth
and the Moon. Accounting for all these effects, one may
compute the ultimate information‐theoretic performances
achievable by satellite quantum communications [136]
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together with practical key rates achievable by current
technology [136, 139, 140]. In particular, one can prove that
the number of secret bits that can be distributed between
two remote ground stations by means of a trusted satellite
can largely exceed the performance achievable by a chain of
perfect quantum repeaters on the ground [136]. This is
illustrated in Figure 3. Further studies have shown the utility
of satellite‐based QKD with respect to global quantum
networks on the ground, even when the more powerful
strategy of multi‐path routing is used [41].
2.2 | Remote clock synchronisation
Remote clock synchronisation is an important requirement to
the future of quantum telecommunication, precise posi-
tioning and navigation [12], and applications in fundamental
science [141]. Conventional time synchronisation techniques
rely on measuring the time of arrival of electromagnetic
pulses [142, 143]. These classical methods are both suscep-
tible to malicious intervention [144] and are limited in ac-
curacy by the available power and bandwidth. Methods from
quantum communications can address both these limitations
to securely distribute high‐precision time information.
Quantum clock synchronisation ensures both accurate and
secure time transfer by using entanglement‐based protocols
[14, 145, 146]. Clock synchronisation based on arrival time of
photon pairs (not necessarily entangled) can also have signifi-
cantly less jitter than classical methods [147, 148]. Frequency‐
entangled pulses are used to construct quantum analogues of
classical clock synchronisation [149]. Specifically, the quantum
signal is used to encode both the time transfer and the secret‐
key generation. Once entanglement is established between
optical atomic clocks, the intervening medium has no effect on
the synchronisation [14]. This gives entanglement based clock
synchronisation an additional strength. Entanglement purifi-
cation operations can remove any systematic errors that arise
from the use of unsynchronised clocks, which eliminate the
requirement for a common phase reference between each
clock within a quantum network [42]. A network of optical
atomic clocks operating at the fundamental precision limit was
proposed in Ref. [45].
The feasibility of using satellite‐based quantum clock syn-
chronisation was verified in Ref. [149], which accounted for a
near‐Earth orbiting satellite with atmospheric dispersion
cancellation. A satellite‐to‐ground clock synchronisation that
attained a time data rate of 9 kHz and a time‐transfer precision
of 30 ps has been demonstrated in Ref. [150].
2.3 | Quantum entanglement distribution
Satellites and ground‐based fibre quantum communication
links can be used to create a global scale quantum Internet.
F I GURE 2 Some satellite‐based quantum communication configurations. There are many possible different ways of utilising satellites to mediate quantum
communication links. Each red line represents a quantum channel from a transmitter (Tx) to a receiver (Rx). (a) An optical ground station transmits quantum
signal states to an orbiting satellite where they are measured [127]. (b) This topology can be reversed such that the satellite carries the quantum source and sends
signals down to the Earth [128]. (c) A satellite distributes entanglement to two grounds stations by transmitting entangled photon pairs [129, 130]. For MDI‐
QKD, a double uplink configuration could be used [131, 132]. (d) Inter‐satellite links with ground links. In general, more complex network topologies can be
created from multiple channels [133]. MDI, measurement device independent; QKD, quantum key distribution
F I GURE 3 Comparison between ground‐based and satellite‐based
QKD. We plot the number of secret bits per day versus ground distance
that are distributed between two stations, assuming a clock (repetition rate)
of 5 MHz. The black lines represent the optimal key rates achievable by a
repeaterless fibre‐connection (PLOB bound [123]) and by repeater‐based
fibre connections assisted by 1, 5, 20 and 50 ideal quantum repeater nodes
[33]. The red line represents the constant key rate that is achievable by using
a near‐polar sun‐synchronous satellite crossing the zenith of the two
ground stations operating in trusted node. This is for a mean altitude of
530 km in downlink at 800 nm. The performance accounts for all the
effects of diffraction, atmospheric extinction, (weak) turbulence, pointing
error and background thermal noise. Ground‐based PLOB bound is beaten
at ≃215 km of standard optical fibre. See Ref. [136] for details about the
parameters. QKD, quantum key distribution
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However, the potential applications of the quantum Internet
go beyond just QKD. Entanglement distribution enables a
wide variety of other protocols including distributed and secure
multi‐party quantum computing, and anonymous communi-
cations protocols [151]. Therefore, satellites must support
entanglement distribution. As quantum technologies mature,
higher dimensional and hyper entangled states will inevitably
become of greater interest [152].
Currently, satellites provide the most promising route to
entanglement distribution over global scales [129, 153]. To
improve the reliability of QKD services, multiple ground
stations could cooperate with multiple satellites, with each link
operating collectively, else multiple optical ground stations
(OGSs) separated by a few kilometres within a city could
operate with a single satellite to deliver QKD links to end‐
users within the city. This increases the likelihood of link
availability in the presence of intermittent cloud coverage and
local turbulence effects. Furthermore, secure key store man-
agement for QKD networks with satellite links is important
for improved reliability. Specifically, secure key management
ensures multiple satellite passes can be used to accumulate
sufficient data for key generation [139]. In addition, keys will
likely be used during the day but only replenished during night
operation of satellite QKD where background light effects are
minimised.
High‐speed quantum communication with satellites is un-
likely to exceed even a gigabit per second within the next
10 years, while classical communication bandwidth re-
quirements can be several orders of magnitude higher. Planned
quantum communication satellite missions can generate some
few hundred megabits per year [139]. Thus, it is impractical to
use quantum secure keys in the most secure way possible—as
one‐time pads where the key is the same size as the encrypted
message. A compromise often implemented is to use QKD
keys as seeds for classical AES encryption and update the seed
with a frequency depending on the desired end‐to‐end security
parameter(s) [154].
2.4 | Towards long‐range quantum
entanglement networks
Global quantum connectivity requires multi‐segment entan-
glement distribution links [155]. A single satellite could
connect two points separated by a few thousand kilometres,
with the upper limit governed by the satellites' altitude and
minimum elevation through the atmosphere. A satellite in
geostationary orbit could cover approximately a third of the
globe. However, the achievable entanglement link rates will
be heavily suppressed owing to the extreme range involved
and low elevations at the extremities of the satellites trajec-
tory. This suppression is pronounced when taking into ac-
count dual path losses for non‐memory assisted entanglement
distribution.
Going beyond single‐satellite mediated entanglement
distribution requires more complicated architectures such as
entanglement swapping or quantum memories towards the
realisation of a space‐based quantum repeater architecture.
Different physical realisations have been proposed to imple-
ment a working quantum repeater depending on the loss and
operational error correction techniques employed [156]. In
first generation QRs [59], the entire communication length is
divided into 2n shorter segments (L = L0 � 2n), where n is
the nesting level of the repeater. Entanglement is first created
within each segment and stored in respective quantum
memories (QMs) in a heralded manner. Upon the successful
creation of such short‐scale entangled states, the QMs are
read out and the entangled state is distributed across the
whole link via entanglement swapping operations. Errors
originating from losses and operation are corrected through
the use of heralded entanglement generation and purification
protocols. This allows for the distribution of high fidelity Bell
pairs across lossy channels at the expense of rate; fibre‐based
entanglement distribution beyond a few thousand kilometres
seems unpractical even with the most ambitious schemes
[157].
Second generation QRs use heralded generation of
entanglement to correct for losses. However, they need
quantum error correction to compensate for operational losses
[158]. Third generation repeaters on the other hand do not use
heralding but rely fully on quantum error correction. These
schemes can reach kilohertz rates across global distances as can
be seen in Figure 3 with a tremendous technical overhead; each
individual node should contain a small‐scale quantum com-
puter for error correction. In the case of third generation QRs,
inter‐node distance must be very small so that individual
channel loss is <3 dB (50%) in order to deterministically
correct the errors. This would require placing a node every few
kilometres across the whole intercontinental link after taking
coupling and detection losses [159] into account.
In order to extend the range of technically less demanding
first generation repeaters, Boone et al. has proposed a hybrid,
space‐borne QR scheme [160] where entangled photon pair
sources are located on board orbiting satellites and the mem-
ories in ground stations. It was shown that meaningful key
rates can be obtained across ∼104 km even with small nesting
levels, n = 3. The main limitation of this scheme is that each
ground station must have good weather conditions while the
link is in operation, which is extremely unlikely to achieve with
n ≥ 3. A fully space‐based quantum repeater scheme, such as
the one in Figure 4, have been proposed and analysed recently
[133, 134]. Placing all the components in space is expected to
bring ∼4 orders of magnitude faster entanglement distribution
rates across ∼104 km with first generation QRs (see
Section 5.5).
A constellation of satellites equipped with entanglement
sources and quantum memories will thus be required to create
dynamically configurable multi‐link connections between any
two points on the Earth. Beyond the distribution of bipartite
entanglement, it may be beneficial to create multi‐partite states
such as cluster [161] or graph states [162]. These can be
constructed from many individual entangled pairs distributed
to the ground stations but it may be more efficient to develop
methods by which they can be generated at the level of the
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satellite network. This would involve multiple quantum
memories per satellite node and the ability to perform fusion
operations on the board satellite. Ultimately, quantum com-
puters may develop to the point where they can be deployed
on satellites and entangled links will be needed to connect
them.
2.5 | Deep‐space communication
Early successes in establishing links between near‐Earth sat-
ellite and ground stations increased momentum to extend
satellite ranges into deep space. Distances in this regime are
generally defined in excess of 2 million kilometres via the
International Telecommunications Union. For deep‐space
applications, the transition from radio waves to optical com-
munications is necessary to counter low data rates that result
from low channel bandwidth. It also permits improvements to
both the transmitter and receiver. For the transmitter, smaller
optics are possible since optical links have a significantly
narrower beam divergence. This permits the use of practically
sized transmitting apertures that can reduce the size of
transmitting beacons [163]. For the receiver, small ground
telescopes with 1–2 m diameters can be used [164]. Optical
detection strategies also enable more capabilities than possible
with radio transmission. This includes direct photo‐detection,
which is difficult to perform at radio photon energies.
Quantum detection methods can also increase photon effi-
ciencies for long‐range optical communications [165]. By
coherently superposing pulse position encodings, a structured
receiver can interferometrically combine the received signal to
produce a high peak signal measured by single photon
detectors. Quantum limits to interplanetary communications
were considered in [166].
Deep‐space links generally require changes to the whole
system design. First, on the transmitter side, efficiently
modulated higher power lasers, and transmitting optics
exhibiting low beam divergence and exceptional pointing
accuracy, are required to improve the channel information
capacity. Second, on the receiver side, large diameter receiver
apertures coupled to efficient detection systems are required
to recover the faint, quantum signals from space. Incorpo-
rating methods from quantum detection theory benefit the
channel capacity [17]. Finally, probes in deep space have a
smaller communication window than near‐Earth probes,
owing to an increased duration of the probe orbits within
near‐sun angles [167]. Despite this, communication with
deep space probes remains extremely challenging compared
with near‐Earth optical links due to the extremely high
losses that the received signal will always be in the few
photons domain. However, quantum links promises to
improve the communication rate in this scenario by
employing additional degrees of freedom, such as hyper‐
entanglement [168, 169], enacting a more efficient infor-
mation encoding requiring fewer photons per bit [170].
Despite these challenges, deep‐space quantum links herald
a new platform to stretch experimental quantum communi-
cation experiments. These experiments include synchronisation
of quantum clocks [171], quantum teleportation, Bell tests,
QKD and gravitationally induced decoherence [172]. The long
baseline afforded by an Earth‐Moon channel allows for more
stringent limits to be placed upon superluminal quantum
collapse propagation and free‐choice loopholes in Bell tests
(see Section 6 for a discussion of fundamental tests).
F I GURE 4 Satellite‐mediated entanglement
distribution with quantum memories (nesting level
n = 1). Entangled photon pairs are generated by the
sources on board satellites (Step I). Quantum non‐
demolition (QND) measurements heralds the arrival
of the photon to be stored in a memory (Step II). A
subsequent Bell state measurement (BSM) between
different memories can then extend the range of
entanglement between different end stations
(Step III)
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3 | SPACE QUANTUM
COMMUNICATION DEVELOPMENTS
The use of satellites to distribute entanglement and secure
keys at intercontinental scales have been viewed to be in-
tegral since the late 1990s. The first proposals for QKD
from satellites to ground emerged from Los Alamos by a
research team led by Richard Hughes [173]. Concurrently,
the idea took root in Europe through an EU project
involving the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency
(UK) and LMU Munich. This lead to a demonstration of
free space QKD over high altitude ranges with atmospheric
conditions archetypal at satellite ranges [174]. In addition,
the European Space Agency (ESA) commissioned two
studies on the feasibility and potential of quantum com-
munications in space [137, 138]. This developed into a series
of ESA studies that lead up to the Space QUEST project in
2004. A summary of these studies and the evolution of
Space QUEST towards experiments on the International
Space Station (ISS) were later described in Refs. [175–177].
A key culmination of this stage of EU space research was
the record‐breaking inter‐island campaign, where a 144 km
key exchange was demonstrated with both weak coherent
pulse decoy states [178] and entanglement‐based sources
[179].
The feasibility of space links was investigated through a
series of experiments by Padua University at the Matera Laser
Ranging Observatory (MLRO) of the Italian Space Agency in
Matera, which was initiated in 2003. A single photon exchange
from a low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite (Ajisai) to ground was
realised by exploiting retroreflectors aboard the spacecraft
[180]. This enabled the first satellite qubit transmission with
retroreflectors [181]. A small quantum bit error rate (QBER),
which is defined as the ratio of the error rate to the attained
key rate, was measured in this study. This provided a concrete
demonstration for the practical exploitation of satellite‐based
quantum communications. Later studies extended the single‐
photon transmission distance through use of Medium Earth
orbit (MEO) satellites or higher orbits, up to the current single‐
photon exchange limit of 20,000 km [182, 183].
The use of optical corner reflectors or corner cubes im-
proves the OGS's ability to acquire and track the satellite. The
improved accuracy in pointing, acquisition and tracking
enabled studies of the superposition principle with temporal
modes, that is, time‐bin interference [184]. By combining
the temporal and polarisation degrees of freedom of a single
photon, the wave‐particle duality was then tested in space
following the John Wheeler gedanken experiment of
the delayed‐choice [185]. This experiment confirmed the
quantum mechanical prediction in a novel and much larger
scale compared with ground tests.
Between 2008 [186] and 2018 [177], EU teams showed
great progress in ground demonstrations and technology
platform developments, without attracting additional support
to reach mission threshold. Meanwhile groups in China have
taken up the mantle by launching the world's first major
quantum communications satellite as part of a much larger
quantum technologies program [129, 187, 188]. Stimulated by
these outstanding results, several groups worldwide have now
made rapid progress towards satellite quantum communica-
tions missions, many of which are reviewed in this paper.
Groups from Canada, Japan, Singapore, Switzerland and the
United Kingdom have started to look at commercial exploi-
tation of quantum communications missions.
Figure 5 illustrates a timeline of key missions that have
demonstrated key milestones or have conducted feasibility
studies of global, satellite‐based quantum communications.
Proposed missions and their scientific objectives are included.
We also illustrate the number of missions that take advantage
of the small satellite. The dramatic increase demonstrates the
F I GURE 5 Timeline of key milestones in satellite QKD. We show recent field demonstrations and feasibility studies from 2005, pioneering studies in the
mid 1990s and early 2000s are discussed in the main text. This includes ground tests and establishing entanglement links with orbiting satellites. These milestones
are indicated with blue boxes. Red boxes indicate proposed missions and their objectives. The number of CubeSat launches are illustrated in brown [189]. It is to
be noted that the increase in the number of missions involving CubeSats reflects their growing importance in satellite‐based global quantum communications.
QKD, quantum key distribution
8 - SIDHU ET AL.
importance of small satellites in future quantum space mis-
sions. For a complete exposition of satellite missions, the
reader is directed to Refs. [206, 207].
Uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV) platforms are gaining in-
terest in recent years due to being cost effective and robust
alternatives for quantum communication systems [208, 209]. If
extended over a few thousand kilometres, these systems have
the potential of operating in all weather conditions, unlike
satellite‐based systems, which require clear weather conditions.
Recent experiment has demonstrated entanglement distribu-
tion across 1 km distance [210]. As mobile networks,
high‐altitude UAV platforms [211] have the potential of con-
necting satellites with ground networks.
3.1 | QUESS satellite
Quantum Experiments at Space Scale (QUESS) is a Chinese
research project operated by the Chinese Academy of Sciences.
The mission uses a LEO satellite called Micius, to demonstrate
space‐based quantum communication. This successfully
demonstrated integration with existing ground‐based net-
works, generating unconditionally secure quantum crypto-
graphic keys over intercontinental distances between Asia and
Europe, and the demonstration of quantum entanglement
distribution and quantum teleportation at space scales.
To date, this initiative has demonstrated three key mile-
stones towards a global‐scale quantum Internet. First, it has
achieved secure satellite‐to‐ground exchange of cryptographic
keys between the Micius satellite and multiple ground stations
in China. It has implemented decoy‐state QKD with a kilo-
hertz key rate over a distance of 1200 km [187]. By using a
weak coherent pulse at high channel losses, the keys are secure
because photon‐number‐splitting eavesdropping can be
detected. This key rate is around 20 orders of magnitudes
greater than that expected using an optical fibre of the same
length. Second, the Micius satellite has demonstrated the
capability of two‐photon entanglement distribution to ground
stations separated by 1200 km, and a violation of Bell
inequality of 2.37 ± 0.09 under strict Einstein locality condi-
tions [129]. After significant improvements in collection optics
that improved the link transmission, sufficient number of
photons can be detected to realise the BBM92 protocol across
1120 km [130]. This is a crucial stage to demonstrate the
feasibility of a true global quantum communication network.
Third, quantum teleportation of independent single‐photon
qubits has been demonstrated through an uplink channel for
ground‐to‐satellite quantum teleportation over distances of up
to 1400 km [188]. This demonstration successfully teleported
six input states in mutually unbiased bases with an average
fidelity of 0.80 ± 0.01, which is above the optimal state‐
estimation fidelity on a single copy of a qubit [212].
Improving this fidelity is an essential future step to enabling
space‐based quantum repeaters.
The Micius satellite has also been used as a trusted relay
between different ground stations for high‐security key ex-
change. This was demonstrated in a video conference between
China and Vienna for intercontinental quantum‐secured
communication [213]. In addition, a large‐scale, hybrid quan-
tum communication network has been realised by integrating
space links provided by the Micius satellite to an already
existing 2000 km long Beijing–Shanghai trusted node link
resulting in a total quantum communication distance of
4600 km [153]. This work is the first example of an inter-
continental scale QKD network with around 150 users. These
experiments are the first steps towards a global space‐based
quantum Internet.
3.2 | Small‐satellite efforts
To demonstrate and implement a global quantum communi-
cation network with multiple users and reasonable coverage,
we require a constellation of satellites. This presents a signif-
icant obstacle for the Micius initiative. Specifically, large sat-
ellites are expensive to develop and will take substantially more
time to develop such a constellation of low‐Earth orbit trusted
nodes for QKD service provision. An alternative approach
that has received a surge of interest is the use of CubeSats
[214]. These are miniaturised nanosatellites for space research
that are made up of module units of 10 � 10 � 10 cm cubic
units, and a mass of no more than 1.33 kg per unit. The chassis
of a single unit CubeSat is illustrated in Figure 6. The mini-
aturised size of CubeSats limits the size of onboard optical
telescope apertures, the volumetric space, weight and power
(SWaP) required by the payload, thermal design and pointing
stability of the platform. Together with their lower develop-
ment cost, shorter development times and increased deploy-
ment opportunities, CubeSats have the potential to deliver
rapid progress in space quantum technologies that are ex-
pected to surpass conventional space systems development
F I GURE 6 An illustration of a one‐unit CubeSat chassis of
dimensions 10 cm a side based on the CubeSat design specification
standard. Miniaturised satellites can be assembled by loading each frame
with the necessary components, such as power systems, communications,
altitude determination and control systems, and control. Each unit can be
readily stacked to form a multiple unit, modular nanosatellite. This provides
a low‐cost and time efficient solution for quantum communication
implementations in space
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[215–217]. This has ushered in the CubeSat era in space
research [218, 219].
The 6U CubeSat platform is commonly used since it de-
livers the largest size with a favourable cost to capability trade‐
off for many high‐performance nanosatellite missions [220].
Several design studies have used 6U CubeSats for Earth
observation, as it accommodates a reasonably large optical
assembly together with ancillary payloads. There are approxi-
mately 65 6U missions under development. Since CubeSats are
not restricted to Earth orbits, some missions choose the rela-
tively bulky 12U form factor to be able to accommodate the
largest possible telescope aperture on a CubeSat [203]. A re-
view on all current approaches of satellite QKD enabling ini-
tiatives has been summarised by Bedington et al. [206]. An
advantage of the CubeSat approach is the availability of con-
ventional off‐the‐shelf components in order to reduce costs
and development time. We briefly summarise a selection of
small satellite mission proposals, development and upcoming
launches in the remainder of this section.
3.2.1 | CubeSat Quantum Communications
Mission
Growing out of bilateral effort between the United Kingdom
and Singapore on developing space quantum technologies
[199, 215, 221, 222], the CubeSat Quantum Communications
Mission (CQuCoM) was proposed by a 6‐nation consortium in
2015 [128]. The mission concept comprised a 6U CubeSat that
would transmit quantum signals to Earth, with the MLRO in
Italy being the primary receiving ground station. This would
help establish efficient constellations of low‐Earth orbit trus-
ted nodes for QKD service provision. In addition, the mission
would include atmospheric visibility simulation and satellite
QKD threat analysis. The project leveraged the lower costs of
the platform and orbital ride‐share to propose two successive
launches. The first mission would implement the decoy‐state
weak coherent pulse BB84 protocol as a low risk pathfinder;
the second would implement QKD with entangled photon
sources. The CubeSats would have been deployed from the ISS
into a 400 km circular orbit with a projected mission lifetime of
12 months. The programme would have exploited the rapidly
improving nanosatellite altitude determination and control
systems (ADCS) as demonstrated on contemporary missions
such as the MinXSS [223] and the bright target explorer [224].
CQuCoM inspired several follow‐on CubeSat missions,
including SpeQtre, quantum research CubeSat (QUARC)/
responsive operations and key services (ROKS), QUBE,
NANOBOB/Q3sat, are described in the following sections.
3.2.2 | SpeQtre
This project is another bilateral UK–Singapore effort coordi-
nated by RAL Space and the Centre for Quantum Technolo-
gies [225]. In this effort, the goal is to demonstrate
entanglement distribution between a CubeSat platform and
optical ground receivers on Earth. This would pave the way for
a constellation of entanglement transmitters from space, and is
under active development. This project draws heritage from
previous Singaporean quantum CubeSat missions launched in
2014, 2015 and 2019 [140]. RALSpace directs the development
of the spacecraft bus capable of establishing the optical link for
entanglement distribution, and the design, development and
implementation of the OGS. One of the objectives in this
mission is to test optical ground receivers near major popu-
lation centres, to implement connectivity with the existing
metropolitan quantum networks.
This program has also studied the effects of different
constellations on entanglement distribution across the globe.
This included studying different constellation arrangements
for serving the Indo‐ASEAN region, which concluded that
over the course of a single year, tens of Mbits of secret keys
could be distributed after consideration of the atmospheric
effects [226].
3.2.3 | Quantum research CubeSat
The QUARC is a UK initiative for QKD service provision
across the United Kingdom. The initial scope was concen-
trated on miniaturised pointing and tracking subsystems suit-
able for CubeSat payloads. Now, the mission has expanded to
the design and construction of compact decoy‐state weak
coherent pulse BB84 sources and a portable OGS. A pre-
liminary use case was the security of the UK critical national
infrastructure [227] with a detailed study of link availability
based on weather patterns, and identifying availability of suit-
able OGS locations close to metropolis regions. For a 15
CubeSat constellation topology servicing 43 ground stations
distributed uniformly across the United Kingdom, trade‐offs
between the topology, atmospheric channel and achievable
key rates were considered in Ref. [198].
The best location for a fixed QKD OGS is one which is
close to the end users (most likely in urban centres) but
sufficiently far enough away to avoid the worst of light
pollution. A mobile OGS will be able to identify and trial
such sites. It will consist of a 43 cm telescope system with
attached modules for processing the quantum signal, timing
and synchronisation, tracking and fine pointing and the
beacon systems all mounted in a vehicle [228]. The ability to
rapidly move and deploy the OGS may help overcome
regional cloud cover limitations.
3.2.4 | UK QT hub mission
As part of the UK National Quantum Technology Programme,
the quantum technology hub in quantum communications is
planning to launch a CubeSat mission to demonstrate space to
ground QKD in the 2023–2024 timeframe [229]. This will
leverage design specifications from the previous SpeQtre
mission and the RAL Space developed 12U CubeSat platform
to host a UK‐developed source. A UK OGS facility will be
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developed to support the mission. Lineage from the QUARC
programme will feed into these developments.
3.2.5 | QUBE
This is a German 3U satellite that will implement a downlink
of strongly attenuated light pulses for exchange of encryption
keys. The goal of this first phase of the project is to test the
components and the viability of performing QKD between a
single CubeSat in LEO and an OGS in Germany [205].
3.2.6 | Q3sat
The Quantum‐cubed satellite is an Austrian satellite being
developed as a compact 3U uplink quantum satellite [204]. The
mission aims to produce low cost secure keys at ~EUR20 per
kbit. This minimalist mission uses only two single photon
detectors with minimal radiation shielding and a slow active
basis choice using liquid crystal polarisation modulators.
Further, its limited battery and solar panel capacity only allow
one active downlink every two orbits. Nevertheless, its low cost
makes this the ideal option for early adaptors of the
technology.
3.2.7 | NanoBob
The NanoBob mission [203] is a 12U French‐Austrian initia-
tive to create a versatile QKD receiver in space. The 12U form
factor was chosen to accommodate the largest possible tele-
scope aperture in a standard CubeSat. Using the XACT‐15
ADCS manufactured by Blue Canyon Technologies, its body
pointing is estimated to be precise and fast enough, to track a
ground station or another QKD satellite (in a suitable orbit)
without a fine pointing mechanism. It utilises a passive
polarisation basis choice and four single‐photon detectors. A
cost‐benefit analysis of different orbits concluded that a Sun
Synchronous Orbit would provide the best key rates but a
circular orbit has much lower launch costs and would be the
more economical choice.
3.3 | Quantum Encryption and Science
Satellite
The Canadian Quantum Encryption and Science Satellite
(QEYSSat) will be a micro‐satellite with a 25 cm aperture, and
over 100 kg total mass, and an expected launch in LEO in late
2022 or early 2023 [127]. The primary objective is to study and
advance the science of quantum communication links and
technologies for QKD as well as long‐range quantum entan-
glement [230]. QEYSSat is viewed as a precursor to larger scale
missions and quantum networks.
With its primary payload designed as a quantum receiver,
the QEYSSat mission aims to explore the different quantum
sources and quantum interfaces on the ground, which transmit
photon signals to the receiver aboard the microsatellite [200].
While delivering the photons reliably to the satellite via an
optical up‐link channel is technically more challenging than a
downlink configuration, it offers greater flexibility to study
various quantum sources and quantum interfaces introduced at
the ground segment. For instance, interfacing fibre‐optical
networks with the satellite link can be accommodated by a
dual‐wavelength entangled photon source where one photon
wavelength matches the space link (≈785 nm) and the entan-
gled partner photon's wavelength matches the fibre optical link
(≈1550 nm).
The QEYSSat mission also aims to demonstrate a weak‐
coherent pulse QKD source (≈850 nm) on the space craft
for the study of reference‐frame independent QKD protocols
[231, 232], implemented in a UK‐CAN partnership [233].
3.4 | NASA projects
NASA is pursuing multiple mission studies that aim to develop
a global quantum communications infrastructure through a
space‐based distribution of quantum entanglement [234, 235]
A LEO platform (such as the ISS) [236] could
distribute entanglement between ground stations as far as
1200 km apart—similar to the Micius accomplishments. A
similarly outfitted spacecraft in a higher orbit could connect
ground stations separated by longer baselines. The spacecraft
architecture may consist of a high clock‐rate source of high‐
fidelity entangled photon pairs, a detector array that per-
forms quantum state tomography on the photon pairs, and a
dual‐telescope gimbal system. Furthermore, to overcome the
high losses associated with an untrusted node scenario, high
clock‐rate sources, exceptional pointing accuracy in all tele-
scopes, high photon throughput on both the transmitter and
receiver ends, and large, diffraction‐limited apertures (possibly
aided by adaptive optics [AO]) will be required. See Section 4
for further discussions.
The Deep Space Quantum Link (DSQL) [172, 237] is a
NASA project that plans to perform pioneering experiments to
explore relativistic effects on quantum systems. DSQL plans to
access the regime where the effects of special and general
relativity (GR) affect the outcome of uniquely quantum
primitives such as teleportation, entanglement distribution and
the violation of the Bell's inequalities. These effects have a
more pronounced experimental impact over long‐baseline
channels between exotic orbits, for example, retrograde and
highly elliptical. For example, one potential orbital deployment
for DSQL is the Lunar Gateway [230, 238], a space station
orbiting the moon that will establish a quantum link with
Earth‐based ground stations or high‐altitude platforms orbit-
ing the Earth.
The technology development required for DSQL mirrors
the requirements for high‐performance quantum communi-
cations systems. In particular, support of Lunar–Earth links
needs a minimum pair production rate of the order of
100 MHz to overcome the high loss channel and deliver more
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photon counts than background events. Such a figure corre-
sponds to a clock rate of 10 GHz or higher, assuming a 1%
pair production probability to produce high‐fidelity photon
pairs. The single‐photon detector system would have to
operate at a high rate and efficiency and with low jitter and
background noise. For example, to perform the optical test of
the Einstein Equivalence Principle proposed in Ref. [239],
exceptionally low jitter is required. DSQL could as well enable
or improve some experiments by using quantum memories.
3.5 | Other initiatives
An even simpler approach to quantum space science, pio-
neered by a team at the University of Padua in Italy in
collaboration with Italian Space Agency, involves adding re-
flectors and other simple equipment to regular satellites. By
exploiting corner‐cube retroreflectors (CCR) on board of
already orbiting satellites currently used for satellite laser
ranging, it has been possible to demonstrate the single photon
exchange from a LEO satellite to the MLRO ground station
[180, 181]. After these first demonstrations, the technique has
been used to extend the single photon transmission up to a
MEO satellite [182] and more recently to GNSS orbit [183].
Moreover, the team showed that photons bounced back to
Earth off an existing satellite maintaining their quantum states
and were received with low enough error rates for quantum
cryptography [181]. Through this method, it could be possible
to generate secret keys, by replacing passive CCR with a
modulated version [181, 240]. The advantage of such a scheme
is that it does not require precise pointing of the spacecraft
towards the ground station. On the other hand, velocity ab-
erration limits the diffraction pattern of the retroreflected
pulse, thus imposing a non‐optimal solution for the beam
transmission efficiency. The CCR technique has been also
adopted by a Chinese collaboration to test single photon ex-
change back reflected from the de‐orbiting satellite CHAMP
[241].
Besides CCR, other existing satellites have been used to
perform proof‐of‐principle demonstrations of satellite quan-
tum communications. This is the case of the geostationary
satellite Alphasat I‐XL, whose optical payload LCT has been
used to study the propagation of CV encoded quantum states
beyond Earth atmosphere. A German collaboration was able
to demonstrate the quantum limited detection of coherent
states of light transmitted by LCT payload and received by the
Transportable Adaptive Optical Ground Station, located at
the Teide Observatory [242]. The measurement demonstrated
the persistence of coherent properties of light from satellite
also in the quantum limit and it was able to assess the excess
noise on such a communication channel.
3.6 | Commercial and national efforts
There are numerous planned commercial QKD missions. First,
the ESA is supporting two large commercial efforts: QKDSat
and QUARTZ. These are led by Arqit and SES, respectively,
and form part of the ARTES Secure and Laser communication
Technology (ScyLight) programme [243]. ESA is also working
on the security and cryptographic mission [244] to launch the
Eagle‐1 satellite [245], which will form the space segment of
the EU Quantum Communication Infrastructure initiative
[246, 247]. Second, Craft Prospect aims to demonstrate in‐
orbit autonomous operations for key transfer using machine
learning techniques by 2022 [248]. This effort is part of the
ROKS mission, which is a continuation of the QUARC pro-
gramme that uses a 6U CubeSat platform. Finally, SpeQtral Pte
Ltd. is a spin out company in Singapore that aims to demon-
strate entanglement distribution using CubeSats [215, 217] in
the upcoming SpeQtre mission [225].
4 | SPACE QUANTUM
COMMUNICATION CHALLENGES
Satellite‐based quantum technologies allow quantum commu-
nication over global ranges. However, there is a number of
challenges that must be overcome. First, the propagation of
quantum signals through free space is subject to several miti-
gating sources of noise. These include pointing errors, geo-
metric diffraction, atmospheric turbulence, and background
noise from stray light and daylight operation. Second, quantum
technologies must endure the demanding conditions of space.
Engineering each component for space preparedness and
establishing a networked satellite infrastructure presents unique
challenges. In this section, we provide an overview of some of
these major challenges and highlight current efforts that aim to
mitigate their effects.
4.1 | Security threats
It is important to assess the security of key distribution net-
works against different threat models [18, 112]. End‐users may
experience different threats to those originally envisioned
during development. From a purely engineering perspective,
conventional laser communications are considered more secure
than radio‐based systems due to the much narrower diffraction
limited beam divergences of optical links [249]. It is also
necessary to examine the necessity for the full QKD mecha-
nism when line‐of‐sight is guaranteed between transmitter and
receiver, using other means, such as optical beacons, radar and
optical observation [250]. In such cases, the concerns would be
malicious Trojan‐horse attacks by light injection into the
receiver, or harvesting scattered light into the adversary’s de-
tector [251, 252].
QKD implementations require isolation of trusted devices,
authenticated public communication between nodes and de-
vices that conform to the assumptions of security analyses [18].
Space‐enabled services have additional risks that must be
secured against potential adversaries [253]. This includes the
use of satellites as trusted repeaters or couriers, information
leakage [254], physical attacks on satellites and ground stations
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[255], jamming or spoofing of quantum satellite communica-
tions, and optical attacks. Jamming and spoofing attacks are a
major security vulnerability of space‐based quantum commu-
nications. As illustrated in Figure 7, both the uplink and
downlink channels may face interference from malicious sig-
nals. Uplink jamming is directed towards the satellite and could
be difficult to distinguish from the background noise. This
might impair services for all users in the satellite's reception
area. Downlink jamming has a localised effect because it is
directed at certain ground users. Spoofing deceives the receiver
by introducing a fake signal with erroneous information. An-
tenna anti‐jamming technology can be considered part of stray‐
light rejection of a free‐space link and may become a more
basic research direction for future development [256].
Optical attacks such as light injection may help an attacker
to learn information about the secret key, or to invoke certain
detection events in the QKD receiver. Most single‐photon
detectors can be controlled via bright pulse attacks [257],
and several countermeasures have been developed [258]. An
important attack specific to a free‐space QKD receiver is the
spatial mode‐mismatch vulnerability. Even the slightest spatial
distinguishability of the photon detectors can be exploited for
a man‐in‐the‐middle attack [259]. In this attack, the eaves-
droppers simply implement their own QKD receiver to
intercept and detect all signals, and then send fake photon
pulses to the legitimate receiver that are suitably encoded into
the spatial mode that triggers the required detector. The most
effective countermeasure is a spatial mode filter (pinhole);
however, this can also be vulnerable in itself due to laser‐
induced damage [260]. Atmospheric turbulence will also
reduce the efficiency of this attack [261]. The light‐injection
attack can be extended to other components such as the
quantum random number generators (QRNGs), with the
output being biased by injected light [262]. This shows that
light injection and other active attacks are potential security
risks that should be addressed during the design, test and
certification of quantum information processing devices. In
addition, optical side‐channel attacks may exploit intrinsic
properties of quantum technologies. For example, the
commonly used avalanche photodiodes will emit optical
backflash signals upon detecting a photon that could be
observed and discriminated to determine information on the
receiver's measurement outcomes [251], and has been
demonstrated for free‐space QKD receivers [263].
Another vulnerability results from the fact that current
implementations of satellite‐based QKD use satellites as
trusted nodes [153, 206, 226]. In the simplest case, two
parties establish independent key pairs with the satellite,
which then broadcasts the result of the exclusive‐OR (XOR)
operation on the two keys, this allows the two parties to
now share a secret key. It is assumed that the satellite is
trusted and not under the control of an adversary, this
assumption is crucial for the security of any QKD network
that utilises trusted nodes. It should be noted that trusted
nodes are also used in current fibre‐based QKD networks
to extend their reach [226]. It is vital to restrict access to
these trusted nodes, thus security measures and procedures
must be implemented to protect them and mitigate any
compromise. Eliminating the need to trust the satellite is
possible by entanglement‐based (e.g., E91 [80] or BBM92
[79]) or measurement device independent QKD (MDI‐
QKD) protocols [264, 265]. Long distance links may require
the use of quantum memories to build quantum repeaters,
as discussed in Section 5.5 and in Refs. [266–268].
F I GURE 7 Security threats to satellite QKD. A satellite is naturally hardened against physical access but can be still be vulnerable to a variety of threat
vectors. (a) Passive attacks on the quantum channel. An adversary can exploit side‐channel information through timing, spectral, receiver backflash, and photon
number splitting attacks. (b) Jamming or spoofing attacks on classical communications. Active attacks on the satellite from ground (c) and space (d). These can
vary between Trojan‐horse attacks with light injection, frequency jammers, or kinetic threats. (e) Cyber attacks on the space segment can also be mounted from
orbital assets that can be more difficult to detect compared with attacks from the ground. (f) Passive attacks on the satellite itself can be performed, such as
monitoring emissions that leak information on the transmitted key. QKD, quantum key distribution
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While QKD secures the quantum channel, information can
be leaked via side channels due to for example, frequency
mismatch, imperfections in spectral or temporal mode over-
laps, knowledge of laser diode emission times, etc. [112–119].
The information leaked due to such side‐channel attacks has
been studied [269] and their effects are minimised by careful
design and judicious monitoring of the system. Any remaining
information leakage could then be incorporated into the se-
curity analysis in a similar fashion to [112].
Another important security issue is attacks on the satellite
and ground station [270]. As noted previously, if the satellite is
a trusted node, then it is vital that a hostile party does not gain
control of it. Similarly, tampering with the ground station could
give full access the raw key stored within the ground station.
Even if raw key is protected, if a party can access the optics
they could be able to gain control of the basic settings. Even
limited access to the satellite and ground station could exac-
erbate vulnerabilities due to side channels. The security of the
QKD system is thus predicated on ensuring a hostile party has
no access to either the satellite or the ground station [271].
With the number of space quantum missions increasing, orbital
congestion will further strain successful operation of satellite‐
based quantum communications. While improved tracking
and identification may prevent collisions in space, it also pro-
vides the capability to undermine QKD security [254].
Though some of the threats faced by the satellite QKD are
particular to space deployment the underlying need remains,
shared by all QKD systems, to ensure that all aspects of the
security chain remain hardened. The change in attack surfaces
faced by the satellite QKD may shift vulnerabilities compared
with terrestrial fibre implementations [272]. These issues will
persist as satellite communication applications diversify, though
the emphasis may change from secrecy to more general con-
cerns such as robustness, resiliency and reliability in the face of
adversary action.
4.2 | Protocols, system performance and
optimisation
Operating satellite QKD has several additional complications
over terrestrial implementations. Specifically, there is a restricted
transmission time owing to a satellite overpass and a highly
variable channel loss both within and between pass. A reduced
transmission time imposes finite block effects that limit the
attainable secret key [140]. This contrasts with optical fibre‐
based systems where the protocol proceeds until a
predetermined (typically large) block of data is acquired. Addi-
tionally, stochastic effects of the atmosphere directly improved
studies on channel losses. Current modelling and analyses on
the performance of QKD have focussed on terrestrial‐based
fibre channels. The analyses of currently existing protocols
must be adapted if we are to understand their performances for
satellite QKD. This is important to both aid understanding and
help guide the design and improvements for future missions.
In addition, the optimisation of system parameters, such as
the basis encoding probabilities and signal intensities for decoy
state implementations is an important feature for key generation
under finite block effects. This optimisation may be constrained
owing to physical limitations to some parameters. Understand-
ing the effects of different system parameters on the attainable
key has been studied in Ref. [139].
4.3 | System dependent space‐Earth
channel link losses
The link between the satellite and OGS is characterised by the
high losses (or low transmissivity) that the quantum signal
experiences. Numerical studies of the optical channel between
space and ground predict a link loss of 30–40 dB for a
spacecraft with a 10 cm aperture at 500 km altitude and a 1 m
aperture at the OGS [196]. Micius achieved a total system link
loss of 27 dB with 18–30 cm apertures (non‐diffraction
limited) and 1.2 m diameter ground receivers [130]. The largest
contributor to this loss is the divergence of the beam due to
diffraction, which scales as the inverse square of the propa-
gation distance with the final beam spot size typically several
times larger than the receiving telescope.
Other system factors can increase loss including internal
transmitter and receiver inefficiencies, non‐ideal photon
detection efficiency (PDE), and pointing inaccuracy. Due to
the narrow optical beam divergence necessary for minimising
diffraction spread, the pointing of the telescope has to be
controlled to an extremely precise degree of the order, a
microradian. The satellite must be able to determine its attitude
and position with respect to the OGS, typically with star
trackers and Global Position System receivers, and then control
its direction using mechanisms such as reaction wheels and
magnetic torque coils. A body‐mounted telescope can thus be
coarsely pointed towards the OGS position, so‐called latitude–
longitude–altitude (LLA) pointing. For small satellites, open‐
loop LLA pointing accuracy of 0.01° has been demonstrated
[273], hence an additional mechanism can be employed using a
fast‐steering mirror (FSM) to provide the microrad fine
pointing required. For pointing error that is a fraction of the
beam divergence, the additional loss can be considered minor.
4.4 | Impact of the atmosphere: Turbulence,
noise and weather
A quantum signal propagating through the Earth's atmosphere
is affected by turbulence and an increase in background
noise owing to daylight operation. Both effects directly limit
the attainable key and entanglement distribution rates. The
effects of turbulence are well understood from classical optics
[274]. Specifically, interaction with turbulent eddies in the at-
mosphere cause rapid fluctuations in the transmission effi-
ciency of a communication link. This leads to a stochastic
broadening of the beam waist and wandering of the beam
centroid [275]. Turbulence effects on DV and CV QKD have
also been well studied with ground‐to‐ground horizontal links
[126, 276–278]. An uplink configuration where the quantum
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signal is sent from the ground to space will have significantly
more loss due to the increased beam wander caused by at-
mospheric turbulence than a downlink [279].
Generally, the sensitivity of the quantum signal to atmo-
spheric turbulence depends on the type of encoding chosen.
For example, information in CV QKD protocols is encoded in
the amplitude of Gaussian quadrature‐modulated coherent or
squeezed states of light [18]. These signal fluctuations are
directly affected by atmospheric turbulence and weather con-
ditions [280, 281]. These transmittance fluctuations are known
as channel fading and their impact on CV QKD have been well
studied [126, 277, 282, 283].
Fortunately, there are some methods to enhance robust-
ness against these effects. Hybrid polarisation‐spatial mode
encoding techniques can be more resilient against atmo-
spheric turbulence in some circumstances than pure OAM
states [284]. In addition, AO can correct for the effects of
atmospheric turbulence in QKD systems [285, 286] and
become increasingly effective for large telescope diameters,
with typical loss reduction by as much as 3–7 dB. AO are
most beneficial for systems that need single mode coupling.
The main drawback of adaptive strategies is that establishing
a suitable reference beam for closed loop feedback may not
always be practical. An alternative is to use a 4‐f optical
imaging system to ensure near perfect mode overlap despite
significant beam wander. This has been used to demonstrate
free‐space time‐bin QKD, where interferometric measure-
ments are necessary [287].
Daylight operation of QKD leads to increased back-
scattering of solar radiation in the atmosphere, which in-
creases the background noise in the signal. The effects of
daylight operations on QKD has been investigated for more
than 2 decades and several demonstrations of free space
QKD in daylight have been realised [288–290]. More
recently, by exploiting single mode fibre coupling as spatial
filtering and by using telecommunication wavelength to
minimise the external noise, it has become possible to
demonstrate QKD in daylight with the potential to reach
satellite to ground communication [291, 292]. Previous
demonstrations used near‐IR, narrow wavelength filtering
and baffles around the receiving telescope [290]. In partic-
ular, in Ref. [292], the authors proposed an integrated
photonic circuit as a source of quantum states. This is an
interesting technology for space application, as it might
drastically reduce the SWaP of the payload. CV QKD
protocols may offer advantages in terms of reducing the
amount of external background noise collected by the
receiver by exploiting the mode‐matching of the signals with
the bright local oscillator in homodyne‐like setups, so that
the local oscillator (transmitted or locally generated) acts as
an effective and natural noise filter in frequency [126]. This
paves the way for potential implementations of CV QKD
protocols in daylight conditions for both downlink and
uplink [136].
A particular problem for free‐space optical communica-
tions (FSOCs) is the effect of adverse atmospheric conditions
such as cloudy weather. This affects all space‐ground optical
link schemes and various mitigations have been explored such
as receiver geographic diversity [293]. These measures could
equally apply to SatQKD but there is also the possibility of
utilising wavelengths with better penetration of partially
obscured skies, particularly in the mid to long infrared region
of the spectrum [294]. This requires the development of new
sources and detectors but some progress has been made in this
direction [295–297].
4.5 | SWaP for space segment
The physical size of quantum communication devices are
limited by their complexity, size of constituent components for
bulk optical setups and waveguide sizes for photonic chip scale
setups. Reducing the total satellite weight is a mechanical
optimisation, since designers must ensure that the satellite is
sufficiently robust to survive launch. Radiation shielding, re-
action wheels, for larger satellites and the satellite structure
itself can also increase satellite mass, leading to increased
launch cost. Higher electrical power consumption can be
accommodated by deployable solar panels, though at the cost
of greater complexity, risk, larger electrical power subsystem
and thermal control requirements. Else, the duty cycle of the
payload may need to be restricted to fit within the orbit
averaged power limit. Active temperature stabilisation, high‐
powered beacon lasers, intensive computation and the ADCS
(both reaction wheels and magneto‐torquers) are typically
power hungry subsystems [298].
From sender to receiver, terrestrial QKD systems are often
bulky and expensive devices, for example, a Clavis3 device
from idQuantique [299] has a volume of 24.5 L and weighs
approximately 10 kg. While this is not an issue for applications
in network infrastructure, this presents significant issues in
other applications. There exist smaller QKD transmitters
(≈100 cm3) [300–302] but these do not address the SWaP of
the receiver section, and so limit the available topologies for
implementations. None of the systems cited above were
designed for space, so there can be some conclusions reached
from examining them; however, focussing on systems designed
for space, the lowest SWaP systems with space heritage are
SOTA (1000 cm3, 6.2 kg, 39.5 W) [303] and SPEQS (330 cm3,
300 g, 2 W) [304].
A promising solution to the SWaP of the payload is to use
optical chip devices, which can also be used to integrate the
optics with electronics [305]. The current challenge in chip‐
scale QKD is to integrate the detectors onto the chips
alongside the other optical components. Chip scale trans-
mitters are not as bright as bulk optic sources and chip scale
receiver systems will often need single mode fibre/waveguide
coupling [306]. Chip scale devices also do not solve the re-
quirements of auxiliary systems such as fine pointing and beam
expansion. However, longer term road maps predict the pro-
liferation of tiny (few gram) satellites that can be launched and
propelled using ground or space‐based lasers [307], so such
platforms may be cheap and plentiful for future quantum
networks if these challenges could be solved.
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4.6 | Environment, radiation, thermal,
vacuum, shock/vibration
Single photon detectors are susceptible to damage induced by
space radiation [308] and require to be cooled to below −30°C
to operate. Radiation hardened electronics and devices cannot
be immediately adopted for use in low‐cost missions that use
microsatellites. However, radiation damage can be minimised
by a number of methods. The prominent method is to use
radiation shielding, which increases the size and weight of the
satellite. In addition, by implementing tighter opto‐mechanical
design, it is possible to reduce the cross‐sectional area of
susceptible devices that are exposed to radiation. Alternative
methods include active cooling of the detectors, annealing and
reducing the bias voltage (degraded detector performance)
[309]. Cooling of the detectors can be achieved by passive
radiators, which may reduce the area available for solar panels.
Entanglement sources often rely on temperature sensitive,
three‐ or four‐wave mixing processes in non‐linear optical
media. This necessitates temperature stabilisation that con-
tributes to the total SWaP. For typical Spontaneous Parametric
Down Conversion (SPDC)‐based sources, the typical wave-
length change is about 0.3 nm/°C [310]. The wavelength
change of the pump laser will also contribute to a shift in the
signal and idler wavelengths.
Additionally, the design of optical systems must account
for other space conditions. For example, the surface of a sat-
ellite can exhibit thermal fluctuations that have an extreme
range such as −170°C to 120°C depending on orientation and
time spent in the Sun [217]. However, for a satellite in LEO,
the temperature extremes are significantly smaller as illustrated
in Figure 8. The design of microsatellites must account for this
fluctuation to accommodate thermal expansions that can also
affect sensitive optical alignments. Optical elements should
also be robust to vibrations during launch and operation.
For the most part, quantum communication has proven to
be difficult in daylight conditions because bright background
light can cause significant noise on the detectors. Thus, satellite
quantum communications are currently only possible during
night from an OGS location with minimal light pollution to a
satellite in eclipse. The necessity for dark skies limits the
availability of suitable OGS locations that would allow the best
visibility of the satellite, contribute minimal noise, and which
are relatively close to population centres [198].
4.7 | Optical link configuration
Implementing a QKD link requires a choice for the photon
encoding, operating wavelength, photon bandwidth and de-
tectors. Mission budget aside, the optimal choice of these
optical and system parameters have a strong dependency on
the environment of the optical link. Therefore, a general
statement on the optimal configuration of the link is not
possible. Instead, we review the trade‐offs to consider in
configuring each parameter.
First, there aremany signal encodings that can be chosen. For
DV protocols, signals can be encoded into different photon
degrees of freedom. These include polarisation, time‐bin, fre-
quency, OAM, or spatial modes of qubits or qudits. For appli-
cations in long‐distance free‐space and satellite QKD,OAM and
spatialmode encodings are not suitable since they are susceptible
to atmospheric turbulence [311]. Notably, OAM suffers from
large divergence at long‐distance propagations [312, 313].
Instead, polarisation or time‐bin (or frequency) encodings are a
natural choice given their robustness to atmospheric losses
[181, 184, 187, 213, 314, 315]. For other applications, these
encodings have differing performances that may impact the
attainable key rates. For example, with polarisation being
described by a bidimensional space, it is unsuitable for
qudit encoding. Instead, time‐bin, frequency, and OAM spatial
mode encodings are better suited. Similarly, the use of time‐bin
encoding for satellite links has a drawback of requiring a
compensation for the Doppler effect due to the satellite motion
[184]. Further, for time‐bin encoding with qudits, it is difficult to
perform a true mutually unbiased measurement. This can,
however, be circumvented by adopting a hybrid DV‐CV
approach and using a continuous variable as a second basis [111].
Second, the operating wavelength should be chosen to
minimise different mitigating factors such as diffraction losses,
turbulence sensitivity that differs with varying link configura-
tion (i.e., uplink or downlink), scattering, absorption and
background light levels. Longer wavelengths have the advan-
tage of reduced background photons from light pollution or
sunlight scattering during daytime operation but suffer worse
diffraction losses than shorter wavelengths. There are several
atmospheric transparency windows in the near infrared and
short‐wave (telecommunication) infrared regions that are
usually considered due to the availability and performance of
sources, detectors and optical components operating at these
wavelengths [316]. The performance of the various QKD
components at the chosen wavelength must also be
F I GURE 8 In‐orbit temperature fluctuations of SpooQy‐1 [217]. This
3U CubeSat was deployed from the ISS (400 km altitude) in 2019 and
orbited the Earth every 90 min (5400 s). The temperature is recorded by the
on‐board computer for time period UTC2019‐12‐26 06:39:00 to UTC2019‐
12‐26 20:12:30. Temperature fluctuations were measured within the range
of −10°C to +40°C. The average temperature depends on the fraction of
the orbit, it is in the Earth's shadow as well as the amount of internal power
dissipation
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considered. Specifically, the main variation in the attainable key
rates with the optical wavelength is detector performance to
noise signals induced by dark counts [317]. Visible‐near
infrared (Vis/NIR) silicon detectors have lower noise levels
than InGaAs sensors operating in the short‐wave infrared
(SWIR) region. Superconducting nanowire single photon de-
tectors (SNSPDs) can offer high detection efficiencies (DEs)
and low DCRs over a wide range of wavelengths (Vis to SWIR)
with the trade‐off of greater cost, size, and complexity. At very
long wavelengths, the energy of single photons is low enough
that thermal background counts will dominate the signal unless
the detectors are cryogenically cooled. Alternate detection
schemes such as those based on sum frequency generation
have been proposed to enable Mid‐Infra Red (MIR) satellite‐
based QKD [318]. As detector and source technology im-
proves, there is hope that the MIR spectrum may also become
accessible for quantum communication.
Finally, quantum communication satellites may need to
perform inter‐satellite communication. In such scenarios, the
complications due to the relative motion of satellites (including
accurate time synchronisation, pointing and tracking, and link
availability) are magnified. For untrusted node operation, sat-
ellites must be capable of maintaining at least two active optical
links simultaneously [130]. Such satellite platforms are suitable
for distributing entanglement, acting as quantum repeaters,
performing MDI protocols and quantum teleportation. For
smaller satellites, coarse pointing of a single telescope on
CubeSats is achieved by body pointing through reaction
wheels. However, the disturbance caused by pointing a second
telescope poses a major challenge to the design of smaller
satellites with dual optical links.
4.8 | Timing and synchronisation
Correlating the transmission and reception of quantum signals
is important for satellite QKD. Long distances, relative motion
and uncertainties in time of arrival are significant challenges.
The high loss typical of such links complicates matters.
Dispersion is not an issue for propagation through vacuum,
though there can be minor effects from the atmosphere in
space‐ground links [319].
Most quantum communication protocols account for los-
ses by having the receiver(s) report arrival times of detected
photons. Users then compute the temporal‐cross‐correlation
to identify appropriate detection events. To avoid errors, they
must precisely record the arrival time of all photons with a high
relative accuracy. Timing jitter in the detectors and transmitters
typically limits this relative accuracy to about 50 or 100 ps,
though detector jitter of under 3 ps has been reported in a
SNSPD [320] and 1 ps is demonstrated possible using optical
gating [321]. The transmitter(s) and receiver(s) are also limited
by the precision of their individual local clocks and the clock
signal they share for synchronisation purposes. A common
strategy is to encode the time synchronisation information
onto either the uplink or downlink beacon lasers and discipline
all local clocks to this signal [228].
While the beacon laser allows users to share a frequency
reference, a small percentage of detection events must be
utilised to continually compensate for the varying path length
between the OGS and the satellite. This is because of the
rapidly moving satellite (at roughly 1°/s or linear speeds of up
to ≈8 km/s) [322]. Relativistic effects and other clock drifts
can also be compensated in this manner. Those detection
events used for compensating effective path length differences
should not be re‐used to generate the secure key to help limit
the information that can possibly be leaked to an adversary.
Typically, quantum communication requires some sort of
shared reference frame to enable coherence to be observable
[323]. Beacons can be used to provide alignment information,
for example, a linearly polarised laser allows the receiver to
compensate for any relative rotation around the line of sight
direction. If the change in alignment is slow, reference frame
independent protocols can be used to eliminate the need for
such alignment steps [231, 324]. In CV QKD protocols, the
reference frame (local oscillator phase) can be transferred in
the form of a strong reference pulse that is transmitted along
with the quantum signal (e.g., using orthogonal polarisations)
that can then be mixed to perform a coherent (homodyne [89],
intradyne [325] or heterodyne [90, 91]) measurement by the
receiver. Alternative methods of transferring this phase refer-
ence are also possible [325] but depending on the quantum
degree of freedom (e.g., polarisation, phase, time‐bin) being
used to encode information, a method of reconciling reference
frames is required.
4.9 | Classical communications and data
processing
Quantum communication protocols often require supple-
mentary classical communication channels. For example, QKD
requires authenticated public channel for reconciliation and
other post‐processing tasks to ensure the security of messages.
The overhead can be significant, requiring high‐speed and low
latency classical communication. For correlation of transmitted
and detected signals, time stamp data that has to be transferred
can be generated at several megabytes per second for high‐
speed sources and low‐loss channels. For practical QKD sys-
tems, reconciliation should occur in real‐time to minimise
latency in key generation, hence the need for high‐speed
classical communications channels that can operate simulta-
neously during an over pass. Error correction and privacy
amplification also generates extra traffic. For small satellites,
this can be challenging though the commercial availability of
X‐band and even laser communications sub‐systems for
CubeSats may alleviate this bottleneck [298].
Quantum communication protocols may also require sig-
nificant data processing for tasks such as signal extraction,
error correction and privacy amplification. Computational
power and memory are often constrained on spacecraft. Thus,
it is preferable to offload as much processing tasks to the
ground segment. These limitations are particularly acute in
small satellites [326].
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5 | IMPROVING SPACE‐BASED
QUANTUM TECHNOLOGIES
In this section, we review improvements to key enabling
technologies that could improve the performance of satellite‐
based quantum communications. We also provide a perspec-
tive on system‐level changes that could deliver improvements
independent of developments to individual components.
5.1 | Optical systems
Satellite quantum communications necessarily requires long‐
distance free‐space optical links. Losses in the optical chan-
nel are reduced by increasing transmission aperture diameter
for narrow beam divergence, increasing receiver aperture
diameter to increase collection area and improving beam
pointing to maximise received intensity.
A free‐space optical link uses telescopes to both transmit
and receive quantum signals. Depending on the configuration
of the communication system (see Figure 2), the telescope may
be situated in space or on the ground. Space‐based telescopes
need to be rugged, compact and easily integrated with a
different quantum hardware. New materials, such as Silicon
Carbide, enable lightweight, rigid and thermally stable mirror
substrates, that can reduce the total satellite mass and enable
more optically ambitious designs [327]. One option for
increasing the performance of space‐based telescopes within a
limited SWaP budget is to use deployable optical elements that
are stowed on launch and moved into place once the satellite is
in orbit [328]. For example, the work of [329] increases the
telescope area by four times (increasing the amount of light
transmitted/collected) and the baseline by three times
(decreasing the amount of diffraction) in 1.5U of CubeSat
volume.
Ground‐based telescopes are usually re‐purposed astro-
nomical telescopes or satellite laser ranging observatories,
which perform well for communications purposes but are
quite expensive [330]. Efforts have been made to redesign
satellite quantum communication OGSs from the ground up
without the need for astronomical observation [331]. These
unnecessary requirements include wide‐field diffraction‐limited
imaging performance, sub‐arcsecond level sidereal tracking by
the telescope mount, and broadband spectral performance that
are superfluous for satellite quantum communications. Mass
production of ground optical terminals should also lead to
cost reductions and to considerable saving on total system
costs [332].
Due to the narrow beam divergence of the transmitted
quantum optical signal, high precision pointing is required to
successfully convey weak optical signals across long distances.
This is achieved by the acquisition, pointing and tracking
(APT) system that usually incorporates FSMs, beacons, and
tracking sensors to provide the microradian‐level accuracy
needed (see Section 4.3). These systems increase SWaP de-
mands and are critical failure items. Alternative APT compo-
nents have seen continual advancement in miniaturisation,
price, and performance, leading to greater accessibility to
smaller missions [333, 334]. ADCS for small satellites, usually
employed to perform initial coarse pointing, have seen rapid
improvement in performance levels. This has reached the level
whereby beaconless (open‐loop) body‐only pointing can
enable high‐speed laser communications [273] without the
need of a FSM. If further improvements are possible, this
increases the scope for reduction in cost and system
complexity of quantum communications.
As an alternative to mechanically steered beams, solid‐state
solutions are under development [335] that eliminate moving
parts by the use of electro‐optical modulators [336] or through
phased‐array beam‐forming techniques [337]. There is the
potential from spin‐in from automotive LiDAR development
to further reduce costs and improve miniaturisation [338].
These may allow simplification of mechanical design, increased
reliability, and the development of novel optical configurations
that have operational or performance advantages over con-
ventional layouts.
The addition of AO may improve the link quality and
resilience of the optical channel to turbulence and background
light. This is mainly of use in a downlink configuration
(Figure 2b) where wavefronts arriving at the OGS are distorted
by refractive index variations. These distortions cause distorted
focussed spots that can lead to increased losses through
imperfect coupling to detectors. For some encodings, for
example, time‐bin, turbulence‐induced wavefront errors can
also lead to quantum bit errors unless special receivers are used
[315]. Higher order wavefront correction (beyond tip‐tilt) uti-
lises a wavefront sensor and deformable mirror to undo the
wavefront distortion and allow for restoration of a small point
spread functions and high Strehl ratio [339]. This is especially
important for coupling incoming quantum signals to small
diameter detectors or single mode fibres and for allowing for
aggressive spatial mode filtering to reduce background light
[340, 341].
AO can also be considered in uplink configurations to pre‐
distort a transmitted beam wavefront based on prior knowl-
edge of the turbulence from analysis of an incoming beacon.
This distortion is then reversed as the beam propagates towards
the satellite, which can reduce beam spreading, wander, and loss.
However, the effectiveness of this method is limited by the
isoplanatic patch size and timescales over which the turbulence
occurs, comparedwith the propagation delay over satellite‐Earth
distances [286]. AO systems (apart from tip‐tilt fine‐pointing) are
of relatively limited use on the satellite itself, since thewavefronts
are effectively spherical after propagating from the edge of the
atmosphere to the position of the spacecraft. However, Micro-
electromechanical systems‐based deformable mirrors, such as in
the CubeSat DeMi mission [342] could be integrated into the
optics system to provide active correction of optical aberrations
in flight due to thermal distortion or changes caused from launch
vibration. To fit with the SWaP constraints of smaller satellites,
these devices and optical systems would require significant
miniaturisation before becoming practical.
Recent developments in conventional FSOCs for satellite
applications will become key enablers for quantum space
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communications. Most FSOC sub‐systems can be adapted with
minor modifications, such as APT systems [343]. Other FSOC
sub‐systems include timing and synchronisation, and high data
bandwidth FSOC channels required for auxiliary classical
channels for quantum communication protocols (see
sections 4.8 and 4.9). Optical terminals for the European data
relay service have been tested for QKD compatibility with the
aim of incorporating such functionality with only minor
modification [202]. Conversely, the narrow beam widths and
stringent pointing requirements of QKD naturally boost the
classical communication performance. Thus, integration of
QKD functionality into space FSOC systems may bring
further benefits aside from the security of QKD.
5.2 | Classical communication systems
As just discussed above and in Section 4.9, quantum
communication protocols often require a large exchange of
classical data. Given bandwidth requirements, this naturally
drives the use of shorter wavelengths for satellite communi-
cations, with the progression of commercially available smallsat
radios operating in the VHF, UHF, S‐Band and now X‐Band
regions [344].
Laser communication can offer significant improvements
over radio frequency communication, due to a combination of
smaller beam divergence for a given transmit aperture, hence
lower free‐space loss, as well as higher bandwidth of optical
frequencies. This concept has been demonstrated in several
missions. First, NASA's optical payload for lasercomm science
mission uses a 2.5 W 1550 nm laser with a beam diameter of
2.2 cm, achieving a bandwidth of 50 Mbps [345]. Second,
NICT's space optical communications research advanced
technology satellite (SOCRATES) mission uses a 20 mW
1549 nm laser with a beam diameter of 5 cm and a 175 mW,
976 nm laser with a beam diameter of 1 cm, achieving a
bandwidth of 10 Mbps [303]. Finally, for NASA's planned laser
communications relay demonstration mission, a 500 mW
1550 nm laser is used with a beam diameter of 10 cm, which is
expected to exceed a bandwidth of 1 Gbps [346].
5.3 | Sources
Quantum communications typically require a source of quan-
tum signal states to be transmitted. For prepare and measure
trusted‐node QKD [226], the signals typically comprise single
photon level states (for DV QKD) or coherent states (for CV
QKD). For untrusted‐node QKD, usually entangled photon
pairs sources are used, though MDI QKD utilises non‐
entangled sources (see Ref. [18] for an overview of different
protocols). For non‐entangled DV protocols, true single
photon sources are ideal; however, these are at a relatively low
level of technical maturity, hence lasers are used instead. The
BB84 [347] Weak Coherent Pulse (WCP) Decoy state (DSP)
[348–351], and Coherent One‐Way protocols [352] are the
most popular protocols to use phase‐randomised WCP
sources. Here, a laser pulse is attenuated such that the mean
photon number per pulse is typically less than one to
approximate an ideal single photon source. Due to Poissonian
statistics, a WCP source has a non‐zero multi‐photon emission
probability leading to information leakage to an eavesdropper
but DSPs maintain security despite this [348]. Historically,
WCP sources are the simplest to implement and are a robust
choice for satellites [213]. However, continuous variable and
entanglement‐based sources are reaching sufficient techno-
logical maturity for use in QKD applications [353]. WCPs face
some implementation flaws such as side‐channel information
leakage in auxiliary degrees of freedom, for example, imperfect
spectral or temporal overlap of pulses [269] that can
compromise the security of the implementation. However,
WCP sources have been used for the highest transmission rates
so far, potentially up to GHz repetition in chip‐based plat-
forms [305]. Under development are true single photon
sources, such as those based on quantum dots in 2D materials
[354, 355]. These sources do not require cryogenic tempera-
tures and are also of interest to the wider quantum technology
field. Specifically, highly bright on‐demand sources would have
many applications, as they can be used to improve quantum
communication links.
Entanglement‐based sources offer the advantage of verifi-
able security in untrusted‐node QKD configurations (see
Figure 2c). Here, the users can perform a Bell test to verify that
the quantum states they share are in fact entangled and therefore
the link is secure [80]. In practice, the Bell test is often omitted
and an entangled version of BB84 is implemented instead [79].
Currently, a practical source for entangled photon pairs is
through SPDC. However, their brightness must be traded
against quality, with the pump power being limited to below a
level at which excessive multiple photons are emitted within a
coincidence window and thus degrading entanglement visibility
[356]. While the brightness of entangled sources is fundamen-
tally limited by the damage threshold of the non‐linear optical
crystals used, the practical limit in most cases is either due to
saturation of single photon detectors (in unbalanced configu-
rations, e.g., localmeasurement of one half of each pair) or due to
detection jitter that limits the coincidence detection accuracy.
Waveguide or four wave mixing‐based sources [357] can also
generate entangled photon pairs, but their rate is limited
compared with lower order non‐linear processes [358]. To ach-
ieve a given key rate, an entanglement‐based source needs to be
much brighter than a typical WCP source, but entanglement
protocols like E91 [80] can still produce keys under higher losses
than WCP sources running DSP [204]. Entangled sources with
high quality and brightness would greatly improve the quality of
the quantum channel [128].
Using entanglement, higher dimensional, large alphabets
and hyper entangled states can be used for dense coding [359],
that is, to transmit more than one bit of information per
photon or pulse. While quantum communication can be
implemented with or without entanglement, several other
quantum protocols rely on entanglement distribution, and this
is a strong motivation to develop satellite‐based entanglement
distribution networks as illustrated in Figure 9.
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CV QKD protocols encode information in continuous
degrees of freedom [84, 85, 88], such as the position and
momentum quadratures of the electromagnetic field [18]. A
key difference between CV and DV protocols is that CV
protocols use infinite‐dimensional Hilbert spaces, so that they
can encode more information per pulse and potentially achieve
much higher key rates than DV protocols (e.g., reaching the
PLOB bound [123]). Typically, CV sources are based on
Gaussian‐modulated coherent states, which are easy to
generate for the transmitter and are also easy to detect by the
receiver (see Section 4.8). Other schemes may involve the use
of a middle (generally untrusted) relay performing a CV Bell
detection, as is the case of the CV MDI protocol with coherent
states [93]. Currently, CV QKD sources and protocols are
widely used for terrestrial links [94] achieving distances of the
order of 200 km in optical fibre [95]. The security proofs of
CV QKD protocols have recently been extended to the
composable finite‐size scenario, that is, the most general level
of security [18].
Traditionally, quantum sources that have been developed
using bulk optics [222, 360] for space applications, miniatur-
isation and robustness of integrated photonic circuits are
attractive. There has been a general trend towards fabrication
of sources as well as optics using photonic chips [361, 362].
However, the control electronics and ancillary systems will also
need miniaturisation in order to derive full benefit from this
technology [300].
5.4 | Detectors
For ground station receivers and DV systems, the current state
of the art in single photon detection provides sufficient DE,
DCR and timing jitter. DE increases general system
throughput, which directly increases key rates and helps
overcome finite key effects in a shorter amount of time [139].
Dark counts contribute to the total detected error rate and
should be minimised, while timing jitter contributes to an
uncertainty in the detection event time and restricts the
amount of temporal filtering that can be applied to reject
spurious counts. This constrains the maximum repetition rate
of the system so that each detection event can be distinguished.
Current QKD systems generally use either high perfor-
mance single photon avalanche diodes (SPADs) [363, 364] or
higher performance and higher cost SNSPDs [365, 366].
Generally, SNSPDs have lower jitter, can exhibit higher PDEs
especially at longer wavelengths (e.g., 1.55 micron), but have
trade‐off of higher costs, SWaP and lower ease of deployment.
SNSPDs require cryogenic cooling for their operation, though
SPADs benefit from thermoelectric cooling to reduce dark
count. The development of arrays of single photon detectors
opens up new possibilities such as photon number resolution
[367] and wide field of view receivers [368]. SPAD arrays are
reaching a high level of maturity, in part due to demand in
autonomous vehicle LiDAR [369], though SNSPD arrays are
also under development [370].
Space‐based detectors are required for different configura-
tions such as uplink, trusted‐node entanglement downlink and
any inter‐satellite quantum communications. Besides the need
for SWaP improvements for commercial devices [371], there is
the additional need for radiation tolerance and dark count sup-
pression through shielding [372] and laser annealing [373].
Currently available components are sufficient for CV
ground station receivers [374], although the homodyne de-
tectors used in CV QKD are not at the same level of com-
mercial maturity as detectors for DV systems. For CV
F I GURE 9 A global QKD network. (a) Satellites offer a way to extend the range of QKD to global distances by reducing photon absorption and distortion
effects due to the Earth’s atmosphere. Through this approach, a single satellite can establish secure links between different OGSs separated by thousands of
kilometres. A satellite can also act as a trusted courier for quantum keys. As illustrated here, a single satellite can pass over different OGSs, which permits the
sharing of quantum keys with different OGSs. The payload computer transmits a bitwise sum of keys to the two respective ground stations using classical
communications, and this enables the ground sites to generate a secure key between them, regardless of their distance. (b) This figure illustrates a general network
of satellites and OGSs to realise global quantum communications. Each satellite and OGS act as a network node and are linked together to form repeater chains.
This naturalises transmission links to arbitrary quantum networks over global scales that can be analysed using deep results from classical network theory. This
can help choose optimised OGS ground network and satellite coverage to distribute entanglement in a resource efficient way. In such a network, OGS transmit
quantum signals to the satellites, and through Bell measurement, each satellite can perform entanglement swapping and purification or measurement‐device‐
independent QKD. OGS, optical ground station; QKD, quantum key distribution
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detectors, homodyne‐based detection relaxes the performance
requirements of the photodetectors [89, 91, 375].
5.5 | Quantum memories
Quantum memories (QMs) [376–378] are of central impor-
tance to many protocols in quantum information processing
where synchronisation of otherwise probabilistic events are
needed. One application on this is in quantum communica-
tions, where QMs could act as nodes of quantum repeaters.
However, practical quantum repeaters are still far from being
realised in the laboratory due to their technically demanding
nature. Therefore, efforts have been largely focussed on
implementing memory‐assisted (MA) QKD [266–268] pro-
tocols, which are the simplest use‐case of QMs in quantum
communications. The main idea is to divide the total
communication distance into two segments separated by a
central station housing two QMs. For an inward scheme, Alice
and Bob prepare single photons as per the usual BB84 setting
and send them towards a central station where they are stored
in QMs [266, 267]. A Bell‐state measurement (BSM) is then
performed on the memories to extract a secret key. Conversely,
for an outward scheme, single photons entangled with the
internal atomic states of the QMs at the central station are sent
to the communicating parties [268]. A BSM is then performed,
again upon the successful detection of a single photon by
Alice and Bob to extract a secret key. The use of QMs in these
protocols allow the key rate to scale with ffiffiffiffiffiffiηch
p , therefore
outperforming the limit of 1.44ηch bits per use for a direct
communication link [123]. Ideally, one could reach the single‐
repeater bound −log2ð1 −
ffiffiffiffiffiffiηch
p
Þ [33]. The first experimental
MA‐QKD work has only recently been performed with an SiV
centre in diamond cooled down to ∼100 mK as a QM [379].
These ideas can be extended to space‐based scenarios to
increase the attainable key rates in a line of sight setting.
Storage time of around ∼100 ms in combination with >50%
storage efficiency would increase the key rate by an order of
magnitude [133] over direct entanglement distribution pro-
tocols [80, 380] with an inwards (uplink) scheme. The outward
(downlink) scheme experiences less loss; however, it requires
significantly longer storage times, in the order of seconds,
together with a temporal multiplexing capability to store up to
1000 temporal modes [133]. The required storage time can be
reduced further with many memory pairs operating in parallel,
as proposed in Ref. [381]. Unlike the uplink scheme, the
downlink protocol could be extended into a full space‐based
repeater architecture with further entanglement swapping op-
erations between the neighbouring nodes.
As discussed in Section 2.4, a full quantum repeater
network realised with the help of QMs is essential for
extending the range of untrusted quantum networks to truly
global (>104 km) distances [133, 134, 160]. In this context,
quantum memories on board satellites could bring several
advantages over hybrid schemes where the memories are
located in ground stations. First, it reduces the number of
space to ground links from 2(n+1) where n is the nesting level
to 2. Likewise, the number of ground stations is reduced from
2(n)+1 to 2. This greatly relaxes the requirement that all ground
stations should simultaneously have good weather conditions.
Second, space‐ground links may suffer from the atmospheric
loss, which becomes dominant at small grazing angles as the
channel length increases. Space‐space links, on the other hand,
are mainly limited by the beam diffraction and available
receiver aperture. Lastly, space‐space links would suffer
significantly less from Doppler shifts, which should be
compensated to ensure the indistinguishability of the photons
for the BSM. In light of these advantages, recent analyses have
demonstrated that utilising QMs on board would facilitate
entanglement distribution across global distances in time a
scale of ∼1 s [133, 134], which is at least four orders of
magnitude faster than hybrid ground‐space repeater links.
Currently, the technically demanding nature of the QM
experiments have stimulated research towards hybrid satellite‐
ground QR network architectures [160, 382], where QMs are
located in ground stations. However, promising recent tech-
nical advances in the field warrant attention to the ideas pre-
sented in this section. These advances take place in three
independent fronts. First, the rapidly developing field of space‐
based atomic physics experiments for gravity sensing, atom
interferometry and optical clocks. These efforts have culmi-
nated in the realisation of the first Bose–Einstein condensate
(BEC) in space [383] in a suborbital flight and operation of a
BEC experiment on‐board the ISS [384]. Second, significant
advances in the performances of QMs have been demon-
strated. Sub‐second long storage times have been successfully
combined with high efficiencies in the single‐photon regime
[385] whereas classical light has been stored for around a
second in a warm vapour [386], for up to a minute in a cold‐
atom based memory [387] and very recently for up to an hour
in a rare‐earth ion doped (REID) crystal [388]. Finally, inte-
gration and miniaturisation of these devices is another direc-
tion that many researchers are pursuing. These efforts include
on‐chip memories based on single colour centres in diamond
[389], laser‐written waveguide QMs in REID crystals [390] and
atom‐chip quantum memories [391]. Thus, one can hope that
operation of such memory devices in space will soon be within
reach.
5.5.1 | Frequency conversion
Coherent frequency conversion of optical signals is desirable
for integrating space and terrestrial networks as current hybrid
networks rely on measurement and re‐transmission [153].
Quantum coupling of free‐space and fibre links would allow
for untrusted OGSs as access points between space and
ground, and entanglement distribution via satellites and optical
fibres [392]. Entanglement distribution could be via the use of
quantum repeaters equipped with memories in each OGS to
relay the quantum states to other users in the network (or
satellite) for a downlink (or uplink) scenario.
The wavelengths (frequencies) employed for the satellite
link may differ from the ideal wavelengths for either onward
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long‐distance fibre‐based QKD or for coupling into quantum
memories that require atomically narrow transitions [393].
Therefore, coherent frequency conversion will become a very
important technology to match the requirements of the
different network segments. Multimode wavelength conversion
is possible but single‐mode operation may be dictated by
downstream utilisation, coupling into single mode fibres for
example [392].
So far, frequency conversion has been mainly demon-
strated with non‐linear crystals either in bulk or waveguide
geometry [394–399]. Alternative systems such as atomic en-
sembles have also been used for conversion from quantum
memory wavelengths to telecommunication bands [393]. In-
ternal conversion efficiencies of these experiments were
limited to around 50%; however, this limit has recently been
pushed to an unprecedented 96% in an experiment where
long‐distance entanglement distribution has been demon-
strated between Rb atoms and telecommunication photons at
1522 nm [400]. Upconversion can also be used to allow for the
detection of 1550 nm signals using silicon detectors by first
transforming the longer wavelength photons into shorter
wavelength photons that are within the absorption band of
cheaper Si‐SPADs [291].
5.5.2 | Vacuum
Many quantum platforms require ultra‐high vacuum (UHV)
conditions in order to operate, such as cold atomic gases and
ions. Despite being in the vacuum of space, dedicated UHV
systems are usually required to provide these conditions. There
has not been a high demand for satellite UHV systems outside
of quantum applications; hence, the maturity of space UHV
technology is relatively low.
The challenge for their development is mainly SWaP but
also long‐term operation and reliability. In addition, the
operation of the UHV system must not affect the rest of the
payload, for example, vibration from pumps or magnetics
fields. There are efforts to produce small, robust and low
maintenance systems that are space and microgravity capable
[401–403]. Some approaches utilise chambers with passive
getters [404] whereas the cold atom laboratory on board ISS
uses commercial components [384, 402]. A custom‐made
vacuum chamber with three layers of shielding has been uti-
lised to demonstrate the first in‐orbit operation of an optical
atomic clock [405]. Alternatively, one could exploit the vacuum
of space. This concept has been proposed for the macroscopic
quantum resonators project to test large‐scale quantum su-
perpositions at Lagrange point 2, which has conditions of deep
space [406].
In LEO, the particle density is typically too high for
quantum cold gas experiments, but the wake shield effect has
been proposed to generate UHV conditions external to a
satellite [407, 408]. The high orbital velocity of a LEO satellite
sweeps up gas particles, leaving an extremely low‐density re-
gion in its wake. A specially designed spacecraft could produce
large UHV volumes with the added benefit of near infinite
pumping speed due to the open nature of the chamber. This
was tested by the Wake Shield Facility launched by the Space
Shuttle, though the results were inconclusive [409].
5.6 | Cryogenic systems
Low temperature operation is vital for devices such as super-
conducting detectors, solid state quantum memories and
quantum dot photon sources. This usually requires active
cooling, although for some missions, passive radiative cooling
has been considered to avoid potential issues of pump vibra-
tion [410]. Cryogenic systems have been successfully deployed
on missions such as Gravity Probe B [411], Planck [412] and
Herschel [413]. The duration of these missions were limited by
Helium boil‐off and venting. To simplify deployment and
operation, it is desirable to use closed‐cycle coolers. Current
developments include passive cooling [414] that can reach
down to 16 K by carefully designing the payload and isolating
the experiment from any heat sources; active coolers for
SNSPDs can cool detectors down to 2–4 K [415–417]. In
addition to these efforts, miniaturised cryocoolers are being
developed for tactical and space applications [418] which with
further development could be suitable for use on board
nanosatellites.
5.7 | Clock synchronisation
In quantum communication applications, precise synchroni-
sation between Alice and Bob is required to correctly associate
the symbols transmitted and also to reduce the QBER. A sub‐
ns synchronisation between two terminals is required to fully
exploit the high timing accuracy of current single photon de-
tectors, which can reach few tens of ps. This can be achieved
by sending periodic reference pulses between the two terminals
[187]; however, this solution requires the transmission of an
additional signal thus increasing the complexity of the scheme.
Alternative synchronisation protocols, which do not require
any additional signal other than the quantum one, have been
recently proposed [148, 419]. These protocols exploit the
quantum states to perform clock recovery and retrieve the
beginning of the quantum sate transmission thus avoiding any
other synchronisation signal.
5.8 | Future prospects
In addition to improving individual components on board
satellites, there are also system‐wide implementations that
could improve the performance of satellite QKD. In this
section, we give an overview of some of these more speculative
improvements that may deliver improvements to global
quantum communications.
First, multiple, independently steerable telescopes are
necessary to distribute entanglement to multiple OGSs. This is
essential for a quantum network with untrusted nodes, and in a
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trusted satellite network, to minimise latency for key genera-
tion when multiple ground stations are in view. Transmitting
signals to multiple OGSs independently is also an important
requirement for MDI [93, 264, 265], twin‐field QKD [420] and
implementations that use quantum repeater‐based and quan-
tum memories. However, steering multiple telescopes on small
satellites is difficult given the mechanical complexity and mass
of such a system. Steering separate telescopes could affect
alignment of other satellite and optical systems. These distur-
bances could be mitigated with twin‐tethered nanosatellites
where control of one body‐mounted telescope does not impart
a momentum change to the other system.
Second, formation flying of small satellite clusters would
extend the range of applications that could benefit from sat-
ellite systems. This would be particularly important for
distributed applications such as quantum enhanced sensing.
This would require on‐board implementation of high precision
inter satellite positioning, timing, and synchronisation, for both
relative motional knowledge and control.
Finally, compensation of Doppler shifts due to rapid
relative motion of satellites may be required for some
applications. For example, the typical speed of a LEO satel-
lite is 7800 ms−1, which has a fractional Doppler shift of
β = v/c = 2.6 � 10−5. Compensating for this shift is partic-
ularly important for systems using quantum memories, since
the signal must couple with a narrow line width of the quan-
tum memory. This may require active compensation and
tracking of the shift in conjunction with inter‐conversion be-
tween flying and static quantum systems. Generally, other
optical systems required on a satellite include mechanisms that
can efficiently couple free‐space photons with single modes in
QMs, but also for other applications such as BSMs for MDI
QKD.
6 | FUNDAMENTAL PHYSICS
EXPERIMENTS
Our knowledge of fundamental physics is paved by two
theoretical frameworks. First, GR provides the most accurate
description of gravity to date as a description of the geometry
of space‐time. Second, QM provides a precise explanation for
the physical properties of nature at the scales of atoms and
subatomic particles. Both have demonstrated resounding suc-
cesses through experimentation verification. Despite this, a
framework that treats both GR and QM consistently at the
same time and provides a good understanding of fundamental
physics across all scales has not been found. While a valid
quantum theory of gravity could be a solution to this problem,
any unified theory which aims to provide a consistent
description of the universe would need to address the in-
compatibilities between the two. Progress towards a more
fundamental understanding of physics requires experimental
access to scales where quantum and general relativistic effects
interplay. The advent of satellite‐based quantum communica-
tions gives increased access to space, which enables experi-
ments at larger distances, higher speeds, and with non‐
stationary detectors (Figure 10). This provides a more
F I GURE 1 0 Mindmap of future experiments in fundamental physics that could take advantage of a satellite‐based quantum communication platform.
Different applications are colour‐coded according to different quantum technologies. Dotted circles indicate proof‐of‐concept experiments that would enable
further progress of technologies
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flexible environment to test the interface of quantum and
gravitational theories. Specifically, quantum theoretic pre-
dictions can be tested in curved spacetimes. Any deviations
between these predictions and their experimental outcomes
could indicate a route to unifying quantum theory with GR.
Satellites operating in LEO are currently realisable. These
orbits permit access to distances greater than 103 km and
relative detector speeds of around ∼10−5c. When compared
with terrestrial experiments, the longer free‐fall times enable
high‐precision tests of GR and the equivalence principle for
quantum systems. Space‐based sources of entangled photons
promise long‐distance tests of quantum theory, quantum field
theory (QFT) in curved spacetimes and the interplay between
relativity and quantum entanglement. The list of possible ex-
periments of fundamental physics increases with the accessible
distance. Future missions of satellite‐based quantum commu-
nications will enable experiments at the scale of interplanetary
distances.
In these sections, we review the fundamental physics ex-
periments that can be performed with access to a network of
satellite‐based quantum communications architecture. This
includes performing tests of GR, quantum theory and finding
signatures of Physics beyond the standard model such as dark
matter, modified theories of gravity and QFT in curved
spacetimes. We categorise these experiments in terms of the
main feature of satellite‐based quantum networks they aim to
investigate. These are gravitational and relativistic effects, tests
of the foundations of quantum mechanics and experiments
that use satellite arrays with significant overlaps between them.
6.1 | GR and QFT in curved spacetime
Gravitational time dilation (or gravitational redshift) is one of
the major predictions of GR. A consequence of this effect is
that a clock on Earth will run at a slower rate relative to one in
orbit on a satellite. Any deviation from this could provide hints
towards a modification of GR. While any discrepancy would be
small, the development of satellite‐based atomic clocks allows
us to experimentally test this effect. For example, in 1976, the
Gravity Probe‐A [421] measured the frequency shift of a
satellite‐based atomic clock, relative to one on Earth. The
predictions of GR were verified with an uncertainty of
1.4 � 10−4. This agreement has been improved further by new
experiments, such as those performed using the Galileo 6 and
7 satellites [422, 423], which decreased the uncertainty by a
factor of 5.6.
A different approach to testing gravitational time dilation is
to use satellite‐based interferometry. A Mach–Zehnder inter-
ferometer (MZI) allows a photon to travel two different paths.
If the two paths correspond to different gravitational equipo-
tentials, then gravitational time dilation results in a phase dif-
ference in the two paths, which is observed in the interference
at the output. Similar effects are observed in matter interfer-
ometry, for instance the Collela, Overhauser and Werner
(COW) experiment tested gravitational effects in matter
interferometry within the Newtonian gravity regime [424].
Satellites allow us to increase the size of the interferometer,
which improves the sensitivity such that we can detect effects
beyond the Newtonian regime. A few variants of these ex-
periments have been proposed, where a suitable degree of
freedom serves as a local clock. For instance, one could use the
position of the photon in the interferometer [425] or the
precession of polarisation [426]. A practical implementation
has been proposed using a ‘folded’ interferometer with a single
Earth orbiter and a ground station [427].
Satellite‐based tests of the equivalence principle provide
another method of investigating modifications of GR. In 2017,
the MICROSCOPE [428] mission used a microsatellite to
investigate violations of the equivalence principle. The exper-
iment verified the equivalence principle with a precision of
order 10−15, 100 times better than that achieved using Earth‐
based experiments.
Rather than looking for discrepancies in GR, one could
instead look directly at how quantum phenomena are affected
by gravity. The aim of QFT in curved spacetime is to explore
physics at the intersection of GR and QM, for relatively low
energy regimes. The resulting models give rise to effects such
as Hawking Radiation or particle creation by an expanding
universe. Satellites provide a powerful experimental platform
to investigate the physics of QFT in curved spacetime. For
example, one can look at how curved spacetime affects the
propagation of photons from satellites to Earth [429, 430].
Similarly, photons entangled between a satellite and Earth can
be used to study how gravitational differences, or relative ve-
locities/accelerations between two observers, affects entan-
glement [230]. The previous experiments depend on
transmitting photons from a satellite. Associated with this is
the fact that there should be a relativistic correction to the
mode structure of photons, such as in Laguerre–Gauss modes,
or polarisation [431].
Satellites can also be used to probe other effects associated
with entanglement. For instance, it has been shown that the
entanglement of Gaussian states [429, 430], two mode‐squeezed
states [432] and multipartite W‐states [433] show measurable
changes in curved spacetime. Additionally, curved spacetime has
been theorised to create entanglement [434]. An example of this
is that non‐uniform acceleration and changes in the gravitational
field can create entanglement between modes of a single, local-
ised quantum field, such as electromagnetic [435] or phononic
cavitymodes [436]. Non‐uniform accelerations can also produce
decoherence between spatially separated entangled systems [437,
438]. Another way of testing the effect of curved spacetime on
the entanglement between phononic fields is to employ BECs. It
has been argued that entanglement between excitations of two
BECs is degraded after one of them undergoes a change in the
gravitational field strength [429]. This prediction can be tested if
the two entangled BECs are initially in two separate satellites in
the same orbit, after which one satellite goes into a different
orbit. The effect is observable in a typical orbital manoeuvre of
nanosatellites such as CanX4 and CanX5. New proposals also
show that trapped BEC senors have the potential to be mini-
aturised [439, 440]. This might pave the way for other studies of
fundamental physics using quantum sensors.
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Currently, experimental tests of the previously mentioned
effects are limited. However, satellite technologies allow us to
carry out experiments that will shed light on these interesting
effects and allow for a deeper understanding of how gravity
affects entanglement. For instance, the Space QUEST mission
by ESA is designed to search for gravitational decoherence
effects on an entanglement between the ground and the ISS
[177]. Similarly, the Micius satellite was used to perform an
experiment on entangled photon pairs [441]. These experi-
ments showed that entanglement persists under non‐inertial
motion to within the resolution of the test system. The
result is in agreement with the theory, which predicts that
entanglement is conserved under uniform acceleration [442].
6.1.1 | Tests of modified theories of gravity
One way of detecting modified theories of gravity is to
investigate the phase picked up by photons as they travel
through gravitational fields. For instance, as discussed in the
previous section, one could look at photons propagating be-
tween Earth and a satellite link [443]. In particular, such ex-
periments could detect the existence of screening scalar fields,
such as Chameleon fields [444]. It is possible to determine
photon trajectories for which the phase effects vanish ac-
cording to the predictions of GR. Therefore, deviations would
imply the existence of new physics. Phase shifts of this type
have been detected for massive particles, in the COW experi-
ment as mentioned in the previous section. Similar experi-
ments for massless quantum particles could, in principle, be
designed. In the context of ground‐to‐satellite links, the effect
can be measured by preparing a superposition of two temporal
modes on ground (the so‐called time‐bin encoding)
and sending these towards a satellite, where an unbalanced
interferometer can measure the gravitationally induced phase
shift [230].
6.1.2 | High precision estimation of
fundamental physics parameters
Quantum resources can improve the sensitivity of detectors
over classical methods. This is the field of quantum metrology,
which provides a natural extension to performance improve-
ments using quantum estimation theory. Quantum metrology
has matured into a broad field with many active areas of
theoretical and experimental research. Quantum states such as
squeezed vacuum have been used to suppress statistical fluc-
tuations due to shot noise, which enhances the sensitivity of
detectors to faint signals [445, 446]. This effect has been
implemented to improve gravitational wave detectors [23].
Quantum resources have also been used to precisely measure
parameters that encode relativistic effects, such as proper ac-
celerations, relative distances, time and gravitational field
strengths [447–450]. Further, wave packets of light are known
to evolve as they propagate near massive objects. This evolu-
tion encodes characteristic attributes of the spacetime and can
be used to estimate parameters of it. Methods from relativistic
quantum metrology can be readily implemented in future space
experiments to estimate the spacetime parameters of the Earth
including the Schwarzchild radius and Earth's equatorial
angular velocity [430, 451] with unprecedented precision. This
will improve detector performances for a range of applications
that include positioning, navigation, sensors, radars and gyro-
scopes [429].
6.2 | Tests of foundations of quantum
mechanics
Satellites also provide a platform for experiments that test the
foundations of quantum mechanics. One example is Wheeler's
Delayed Choice Experiment, which consists of a single photon
travelling into a MZI [452]. The key idea of Wheeler is the
possibility of changing the interferometer configuration after
the photon has already entered the MZI. The beam splitter
(BS) that closes the interferometer can be removed or kept in
place. Crucially, this choice is made when the photon is inside
the interferomter. When the BS is present, the device shows
wave‐like behaviour, when the BS is removed the photons
behave like a particle. Classical thinking would suggest that if
the photon is either a particle or a wave, then the photon's
nature should be fixed at the input of the interferometer.
However, due to the ‘delayed choice’, a purely classical inter-
pretation of the process would imply a violation of causality.
Several implementations of Wheeler's Gedankenexperiment
have been realised on the ground [453]. Recently, the delayed‐
choice Gedankenexperiment was also demonstrated on space
channels [185]. In particular, the photons were prepared into a
superposition of two wavepackets (e.g., time‐bin encoding)
sent towards a rapidly moving satellite in orbit, and reflected
back. On the ground, the insertion or removal of the BS at the
measurement apparatus was determined by a QRNG and
implemented after the reflection from the satellite. The
experiment showed the correctness of the quantum mechanical
wave‐particle model also in a space domain, for propagation
distances of up to 3500 km. This paves the path for further
satellite communications‐enabled space‐based experiments to
probe further fundamentals of quantum theory.
6.3 | Experiments using satellite arrays
A network of telescopes that work in collaboration has
significantly better precision and imaging resolutions than in-
dependent telescopes. Specifically, networks with larger base-
lines provide a precise measurement of time differences
between the arrival of signals to each telescope. This can be
used to improve image resolutions and estimate separation
distances between two sources that contribute to the detected
signals. This is the basis of coherent amplitude interferometry,
where multiple objects in mutual close proximity can be
distinguished. This feature has been demonstrated by terrestrial
networks of telescopes to observe the structure of quasars
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[454], and black hole imaging [455]. Satellite‐based networks
also allow access to baselines that are significantly longer than
planetary scales. This promises more precise measurements
and higher resolution images of the universe. In the following
sections, we review how these longer baselines can benefit
multi‐messenger astronomy, and search for theories beyond
the standard model of Physics and dark matter.
6.3.1 | Multi‐messenger astronomy and
gravitational waves
With the advent of the gravitational wave era [456], multi‐
messenger astronomy has emerged as a promising tool to
measure different signals from an astronomical event [457]. For
a blackhole merger, this includes measurements of gamma rays
in addition to gravitational waves. In addition, beyond standard
model theories predict the presence of low mass particles from
exotic light fields (ELFs) [458]. For example, exotic bosonic
fields can give rise to axions and solitons [459]. Detection of
these particles has been associated with dark matter and expla-
nations for the hierarchy problem and the strong charge‐parity
problem [460]. Particles from ELFs have also been proposed
to be found in the vicinity of blackholes causing an effect called
super‐luminescence. Although high‐energy events are not
necessary for the production of ELFs, a significant number of
ELFs must be produced for terrestrial detectors to observe
them. An array of small satellites in LEO, each equipped with
quantum sensors for precise measurement of signal arrival
times, provides a suitably long baseline for multi‐messenger
astronomy of ELFs [461]. It has also been shown that a BEC
can be used as a quantumWeber bar that can detect gravitational
wave signals at high frequencies [436], reaching frequencies that
are not accessible by other detectors such as LIGO. A global
network of BEC gravitational wave detectors could be used to
improve localisation and resolution capabilities.
6.3.2 | Search for dark matter
Dark matter constitutes more than 80% of the known uni-
verse but cannot be directly observed. Proposals for indirect
measurement of dark matter search for weakly interacting
massive particles, topological defects in the universe [462], or
other exotic states of matter. For these proposals, the effects
of dark matter are measured through the use of multi‐
messenger astronomy that is tuned to detect minute dispa-
rate signals [463, 464]. For example, detecting topological
defects involves measuring variations of fundamental con-
stants [465–467]. These variations emerge as shifts in the
atomic energy levels of particles that can be measured by
monitoring their atomic frequencies. To maximise the sensi-
tivity of detecting dark matter candidates, sensors with longer
baselines are required. A network of synchronised small sat-
ellites or CubeSats would provide much greater coverage than
terrestrial‐based arrays. Any topological defect passing
through atomic clocks within the network would lead to a
desynchronisation of the clocks with respect to a reference
clock on the ground [468]. BECs can also be used to search
for ultralight dark‐matter particles [469], constraining dark
energy models [470], and testing physical regimes where
quantum mechanics and GR may interact.
7 | CONCLUSION
Space enables quantum communication applications across
global scales by overcoming the range limitation of current
ground‐based networks. Creating space‐based entanglement
distribution links has unique theoretical and engineering chal-
lenges. Ultimately, the vision is to integrate space‐based sys-
tems with current terrestrial optical networks to realise a truly
global quantum Internet. Significant recent progress in feasi-
bility studies and theoretical work have helped understand and
model limiting factors to guide future field demonstrations of
key milestones towards this vision.
The original ideas for satellite quantum communications
were developed from the 1990s with theoretical analysis and
mission proposals, culminating in the landmark in‐orbit
demonstration by the Micius satellite. Spurred by its success,
international interest in space‐based quantum communications
was reignited. We capture recent advances by reviewing
concerted academic, governmental and commercial efforts.
The quantum Internet is set to deliver a profound impact
across the spectrum of quantum technologies. Applications of
quantum communications have matured into a broad field with
many active areas of theoretical and experimental research. In
this review, we provide a summary of this progress and
establish a roadmap to the development of a space segment of
a global quantum Internet. We identify key challenges, potential
solutions and capabilities to develop. The principle challenge is
the establishment of ground and satellite links that allow for
efficient distribution and routing of quantum entanglement.
We summarise readiness of different technologies for space
quantum communications and highlight key milestones ach-
ieved, and missions in development, succinctly summarised in
a detailed timeline.
Recent developments in space systems, especially the rapid
adoption of small satellites and CubeSats in particular, have
been enthusiastically adopted by space quantum communica-
tions missions. Small satellites allow for rapid and less‐costly
space systems developments, which is especially important in
a rapidly moving field. The quickly expanding capabilities of
small satellites has been driven by miniaturisation of compo-
nents, leading them to be viable platforms beyond simply being
educational tools. This parallel trend exists in striving to min-
iaturise and make more robust quantum components and de-
vices leading to a surge of in‐orbit demonstrations with
CubeSats. Further developments offer the possibility of large
constellation of CubeSats, providing complementary services
to a smaller number of larger satellites in terms of coverage.
We provide an overview of key remaining challenges that
fall within two broad areas: first, increasing the robustness of
quantum signals to mitigate noise in free‐space channels;
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second, engineering each component for space preparedness.
We highlight the recent progress that aims to improve space
quantum technologies by mitigating these effects. We also
provide a perspective on future system‐level changes that could
deliver performance improvements. We conclude with how
space quantum communication could support advancements
across fundamental Physics.
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